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Introduction
There is no body of thought or set of principles that may confidently
be called the "modern theory of economic growth." Current and recent
literature abound with seminal ideas, revealing insights, penetrating
bits and pieces of analysis, loose ends, and unrealistic assumptions,
There are elegant and rigorous models concerned with explaining a very
narrowly conceived phenomenon; there are general discussions that intro-
duce in an ambiguous, imprecise fashion all factors that may conceivably
have any relation to the economic process; and there are contributions
of all points between these extremes. Correspondingly there are writers
who believe that all a theory of economic growth can hope to achieve is
the establishment of a general framework consisting of a number of
general propositions held together by intuition and ad hoc theorizing,
and there are those who feel it may be possible to devise a theory of
growth comparable in elegance and precision to (say) the modern short-
run theory of income determination.
Despite this characterization of the state of and thinking about
theorizing on econmmic growth, an essay purporting to report on this
theorizing must have some kind of order. To establish this order
however it is necessary to take a particular point of view as to the
scope of growth theory, and then to try to make a cohesive and unified
theory of the thought falling within this arbitrarily delimited area
I
This introductory section is devoted to this delimiting process and to
establishing the point of view from which we shall examine current
thinking on our subject.
Modern concern with problems of growth cannot be attributed to a
building up of a received body of thought which in recent years required
as its next layer of bricks a long run theory.1 Rather current interest
in the problems involved in explaining the behavior of an economy over
an extended period results from two major events that have characterized
the world economy since 1920.
In the first place, evidence accumulated that led many economists
to believe that the Western European countries and the United States
had reached a state of maturity such that large scale unemployment was
a chronic problem rather than a periodic nuisance. Keynes* General
Theory may be considered to a very significant degree to constitute a
theoretical explanation of the proposition that it is possible for an
economy to run down and to be unable to generate a sufficiently high
level of activity to avoid involuntary unemployment. Thus although
Keynes" theory is'static and short-run, I it was explaining a phenomenon
that had numerous long-run implications. Therefore the effort to
"dynamize Keynes" led to an interest in the formal properties of a
growth theory
The second event referred to above as provoking interest in growth
economics has to do with the recognition that a. large part of the world s
population is forced to live in conditions of extreme economic poverty.
1 jThis is Simon Kuznets view expressed in his comments on Moses
Abramovitz's essay "Economics of Growth" in B. F. Haley(ed.) A Survey
of Contemporary Economics Vol. II (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc. 1952), p. 180.
3Out of this awareness and out of the great difficulties created for
these so-called underdeveloped countries by the depressed conditions
of the 1930's and World War II grew a demand for programs and policies
that would improve the economic well-being of the population of such
countries. To formulate such programs and policies requires an under-
-tanding of the processes of economic growth, which is to~ say a theory
of economic growth.
Despite this distinction between the growth process in mature
countries and in underdeveloped countries in accounting for the origin
of current thinking on the subject, we feel this distinction to be
irrelevant insofar as theorizing about growth is concerned. A theory
of economic change should proceed from a general definition of an
economic system which is presumably the same for all countries (and
for all writers), and then to explain how this system behaves over a
reasonably long period of calendar time. Certain aspects may be iso-
lated for study, or certain aggregations may be performed in order to
direct the spotlight on what is held to be strategic in a particular
situation at a given time. And in one country it may be useful to
concentrate on one way of looking at the growth process while at another
time or place it may be helpful to look at another part of the system,
but any such incomplete or partial inquiries must be consistent with
the larger, more general theory of which it is a part and which is
applicable to all growing economies. Then by a deepening, widening,
4or disaggregating process it should be found that all partial ancVor
aggregative theories resolve themselves into a consistent general
formalation.2
We propose therefore to examine modern growth theory in the following
way: We begin with the simplest and most formal theory available--
the capital stock adjustment theory associated with the names Harrod
and Domar--and then step by step deepen, widen, and disaggregate in
an effort to bring into the analysis the arguments and hypotheses of
as many contemporary writers as seems warranted. Each section will
therefore be an extension in one way or another of the theory described
in the first section, We maintain the formal framework of the harrod-
Domar analysis throughout. This will not only provide a theme to hold
our essay together, but has the merit of showing how the various com-
poneats isolated and emphasized by the several authors fit together
(or do not fit together) and act on each other.
As the length of the paper must be finite we solve several difficult
problems by simple fiat.
In the first place we concentrate on the behavior of per capita
real income. This m-ear that we define the key problem of a theory
of growth as that of explaining the time path of per capita income
2We thus rule out discussion of the problems of the so-called
underdeveloped countries as such. Of course the statement in the
text does not mean that the "structural parameters" (e .g ., the marginal
propensity to consume) are the same for all countries, but it does
mean that all countries have such parameters.
5over a long period of time, say not less than a century. Per capita
income is chosen as the main criterion of growth f or two simple reasons:
one, virtually all writers direct attention to this variable, and two,
despite some obvious weaknesses in its use, there does not seem to be
a practical alternative. 3
Secondly, it is necessary to take an explicit position with respect
to short.run fluctuations. In discussious of short run phenomena
most authors assume that it is possible to ignore the slower changes
going on in the economy. In an analysis of long-run growth, these
slower changes must of course be examined and worked into the explanatory
system; but then what about the short run fluctuations--frequently
called cycles--can they be ignored? It is evident that the long run
behavior of an economy is not at all independent of what happens in
the short run, but the nature of such interdependence is far from clear
and no simple assumption seems to be appropriate from all points of
view However it is possible to re ognize the interdependence of
cyclical fluctuations and longer run phenomena and at the same time
concentrate attention on the latter, and consider the former only in
terms of how it affects the behavior of the system over a long period
of time without giving a detailed exmination of the modus operandi
4
of the cycle itself. This is the procedure followed in this essay.
A strong opponent of the use of Income as a gauge of economic
growth is S. Herbert Frankel, Economic Impact on Underdeveloped Societies.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), especially Essay III.
4 Some such procedure is implied in much of the literature, Perhaps
the best discussion is in Williai- FPellner, Trends and Cyales In Economic
6We therefore rule out discussion of the formal properties of the
several types of cycle models that are currently extant, but we do
recognize that the growth process is likely to generate fluctuations
and these fluctuations in turn act on the growth process. We seek
then to introduce into our analysis of the determinants of growth the
effect of this fact of interdependence on these determinants and hence,
to some extent at least, on the long run behavior of the economy itself.
Thirdly, we assume that the behavior of the money supply offers
5
no problem in the growth process ,
Finally, except for minor deviations, the discussion is limited
to a closed economy and no effort is made to consider the role of the
government. Omitting the international sector seems justified in light
of the limited extent to which international relations have been
Activity (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956), Chapters 1 and 2.
The most questionable technique is that implied by using data of long-
run time series to estimate a set of parameters designed to explain
the long run behavior of the economy. Such estimates are sure to be
mere averages and devoid of explanatory and predictive significance.
See Stefan Valavanis-Vail, "An Econometric Model of Growth: U.S.A.
1869-1953," American Economic Review, Vol. XLV (May 1955), pp. 197-207
and T. C. Schelling's comments appended thereto, pp. 225-227.
5Professor Fellner (op. cit. Chapters 5 and 9) has a good discussion
of the role of the price level in growth. Robert Solow, "A Note on
the Price Level and Interest Rate in a Growth Model," Review of Economic Studies:
Vol. XXI (1), pp. 74-79 and S. S. Alexander, "The Accelerator as a
Generator of Steady Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIII
(May 1949), pp, 174-198 seem to be the only other authors to give much
attention to the effects of price level behavior.
introduced into the formal theories of economic growth.6 We ezclude
the government from our discussion simply because the existing tools
of economic analysis do not constitute effective methods of analyzing
governmental economic endeavor.
6Useful discussions of some aspects of the role of the International
sector in growth may be found in Harry G. Johnson, "Equilibrium Growth
in an International Economy," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science, Vol. XIX (November, 1953) pp. 478-500 and Trygve Haavelmo,
A Study in the Theory of Economic Evolution (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1954), Part V.
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I. The Aggregative Capital Stock Adjustment Theory
By limiting his analysis to the short-run, Keynes was able to
impound into ceterii paribus all phenomena and characteristics of
an economy that change more slowly than the immediate determinants
of income. The short-run mechanism is assumed to work itself out in
a setting in which capital stock, technology, market structure, saving
habits, social and cultural environment, population, etc., remin
unchanged. With all these as given, the problem was to determine
the equilibrium level of income.
It is possible by a comparative static technique to examine the
effect an the equilibrium level of income of a once and for all
change in any of the occupants of the ceteris paribus pound. And
this has of course been done. For example mauch attention has been
given to the effect of changes in income distribution on the consum-
ption-ineame relt1iinship, and the effect of a change in the extent
of monopoly a the rate of investment. But such changes in these
"underlying" or "basic" characteristics are exogenous to the equili-
brium conditions of the "static" Keynesian model. This statement
is true or approximately true with respect to each member of the
group in the preceding paragraph, emept me, capital stock. By the
8
9way, the short-run system is established, if there is not positive
saving, there is also not positive investment, and if there is net
positive investment the capital stock must be changing. 'bws the
capital stock-surely a relevant determinant of the level ot inoe-
is not exogenous to the short-rum mechanism, but obanges in a wy
directly dependent upon how that mechanism works. 'e first effort
to extend Keynesian short-run theory into a growth problem therefore
was essentially to examine the effects of changes in the capital stock
on the behavior of income.
Since it is capital stock that is changed by saving, it appears
reasonable to define equilibrium in such a manner that it involves
the capital stock. Keynesian equilibrium requires the equality
between desired savings and desired investment, while the growth
form of the model requires for equilibrium the continuing maintenance
of the desired ratio between uapital stock and tne rgte of output.
It is convenient and helpful to label this kind of theory the capital
stock adjustment theory
7
The pioneering papers are R. F. Harrod,"An Essay in Dynamic Theory,"
Economic Journal, Vol. .XLIX (March 1939), pp. 14-33; E. D. Domar, "Capital
Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment," Econometrica, Vol. 14 (April
1946), pp. 137-147; and 8. C. Tsiang, "Rehabilitation of Time Dimensian of
Investment in Iacrodynamic Analysis," Economica, Vol. XVI, N. 8. (August
1049), pp. 204-217.
8
R . C. 0. Matthews, "Capital Stock Adjustment Theories of the Trade
Cycle and the Problem of Policy," in Kenneth K. Xuriharal (editor),
Post-Eeynesian Economics, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1955),
Chapter 7.
10.
The capital stock adjustment theory way be written in a variety
of ways, but we may content ourselves with a single, simple form..9
It was stated above that the central proposition of this theory is the
explicit recognition that investment is capacity creating as well as
income generating; it is therefore useful to develop the capacity
effect and the demand effect separately and then equate theM to show
the requirements for equilibrium.
The supply equations may be written in the following way: let
0 be the equilibrium rate of output during period t; let t be thet t
capital stock available to the system during period t; and let k be
the optimal relationship between capital and output, a technological
constant.
Therefore 0 ; M 4 Kt
and Qt O . 4
where I t- is investment during the t-l period that becomes producing
capital in the t period. Then
where \ is the ratio of net investment to capacity output in the
9D Hamberg. Economic Growth and Instability (New York: Norton
and Company, 1956) discusses the numerous forms the theory may take and
the implications of these several forms. Professor Hamberg also has
extensive references to the literature on this general body of theory.
The reader interested primarily in exploring the details of the larrod-Domar
model should consult the Hamberg volume;*- our problem is something else.
In particular it might be noted that much depends upon the pattern
of lags that is assumed.
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previous period. Equation 1 states that capacity will grow at a constant
percentage rate determined by the productivity of the additions to
capital stock, k, and the proportion of the capacity devoted to the
creation of new capital.
For the effect of investment on demand we need an equation for
consumption expenditures and one for investment expenditures. Maintaining
simplicity, we may write consumption as a function -- 1-a, where a
is average and marginal propensity to save -- of current income, and
investment as a function - - b - - of the change in income over the
immediately preceding periods, all in constant prices. Tus -
and
then 2)
and by simple algebraic manipulation
3.) ___ 5
b-s
Equation 3 asserts that income will grow at a constant percentage
rate determined by the propensity to save and the extent to which
changes in incOme induoe investment.
Assume that in period 0 equilibrium prevails, i.e., ;
equilibrium growth requires that -- ,., .. If 0. then,
since total saving equals total investment and the saving-income ratio
= 
-
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is assumed constant, v must equal s, and the achievement of equilibrium
growth depends upon the equality k a b-s. Under these assumptions as
to relationships and (especially) as to lags b must exceed k by the
amount of the saving ratio. For this reason and for others to be
discussed later it is of considerable importance to distinguish carefully
between k, a supply parameter, and b, a demand parameter. 1 0
Given these assumptions the economy can achieve equilibrium growth,
but if k, b, and a are constants the equilibrium path is unstable in
the sense that deviations from path are not self correcting. Suppose
the system is growing smoothly (b = k + a) but, because of a shock of
some sort, income suddenly fails to grow at the required rate and
excess capacity appears. Entrepreneurs will seek to reddce their
capital stock by reducing investment, but a reduction in investment
leads to further reductions in income and the desired ratio between
capital and output cannot be achieved. If income happens to grow
faster than expected, entrepreneurs finding themselves shy of capital
seek to add to their capital stock but this act leads to further in-
creases in income, and the capital-output ratio remains less than
optimum. Since the theory of growth just described does not tell us
10Cf. A. Kervyn, "A Note on the Accelerator and Constant Growth,"
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XXII (1) (1954-55) pp. 61-66
"We will use the word entrepreneur in a very general sense to
mean those responsible for making decisions as to investment projects
and innovations.
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what happens when equilibrium is disturbed, it cannot explain the
time path of per capita income without further elaboration. As we
have assumed that the purpose of a theory of economic growth is to
explain the time path of per capita income, it is necesary to introduce
some hypotheses that either stabilize the equilibrium path or that
indicate the route that instability imposes on the system. This we
do at the end of this section after some remarks on the theory as it
now stands.
We stated earlier that the only modification made in the meta-
morphosis of Keynes ' static, short-run theory into a dynamic, long-run
theory was the recognition that capital accumulation cannot occur
without the capital stock changing. This means that other strategic
Keynesian concepts were retained, and are presumed to be appropriate
in the long-run context. For example a linear saving-income relationship
that Keynes could draw fairly confidently as applicable for his static,
timeless model was, with no modification, plugged into a model designed
to explain the long-run growth of an economic system.12 The question
did not seem to arise as to whether or not the Keynesian parameters
were in fact parameters when the setting of the model was changed from
short- to long-run. But of course the question is relevant.
1 2 The fact that the early forms of this model were all linear
lead tQ the frightening result that income had to grow throughout
eternity at a constant percentage rate or all was lost. Surely in a
long-run model the linearity assumption is open to question. See
footnote 4 page 75 in the previously cited Solow paper.
14
It is useful then to begin our discussion of the capital stock
adjustment theory of growth by an *ummnation of the concepts of this
theory with respect to their suitability as parametars of a growth..
model. As we are interested in explaining-in accounting for-tb.
behavior of per capita income, the criterion of suitability is the
effectiveness with which a given parameter contributes to this explanation.
The key new parameter i?. this formulation ts the supply pqraueter,
the capital-output ratio. In the simplest form of the theory it is
assumed a technologically fixed constant. At this point we accept
this assumption.
The conceptual problems involved in defining capital are made
much more intricate than usual when the term is being used to define
the capital-output ratio. The most satisfactory approach in computing
the value of a stock is to discount the future stream attributable to
that stock back to the present time. But to measure the capital stock
in this way reduces the capital-output ratio to a tautological constant
devoid of explanatory significance. Also of course two accumulations
of capital stock alike in every respect may have different values
simply because the discount factor is not the same in each case and
this leads to undesirable results when attempting to determine capital
needs. It is tharefore necessary to rule out defining and measuring
the numerator of the capital-output ratio in the way which in other
problems has the most appeal.
15
Resort must be made then to the much less satisfactory technique
of defining investment as the difference between total output and
consumption, and capital as the accumulated value of investment
(with all variables measured in constant prices) - Under ideal circum-
stances this method is satisfactory. It implies that a quantity of
resources are devoted to producing commodities that are not consumed,
and these commodities add to the capacity of the system to produce
more commodities. Since all measurements are in 'real' terms investment
may be assumed to measure resources allocated to the production of
capital goods. 13 Capital is thus thought of in terms of resources
(chiefly labor) required to reproduce the existing stock of machines,
equipment, plant, buildings, etc. Problems arise due to the diffi-
culties of deflating a series from current to constant prices, and
from the difficulties involved in estimating depreciation, But the
basic problem of course is that machines earn quasi-rents, and in less
than ideal--equilibrium--circumstances the behavior of the quasi-rents
may make any measure of capital in terms of its 'real' cost of production
meaningless. As long as the system approaches equilibrium--i.e., as
long as quasi-rents are about what they were expected to be--then
this method of thinking about capital is at least respectable.
There is the further conceptual difficulty of the period of gestation
1 3 These problems are discussed in some detail by Joan Robinson,
"The Production Function and the Theory of Capital," Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. XXI (2) (1953-54), pp. 81-106.
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with respect to capital goods whose productivity is at best indirect,
It is a simple matter to see that the production of one hundred new
looms will have a specific and measurable effect on the capacity of
the textile industry, which effect will be evident immediately upon
the completion of the construction of the looms. But it is not so
clear what the effect on the capacity of the economy will be if the
new capital creation is in the form of schools, hospitals, highways
(or government monuments). The capacity of the system to supply school,
hospital, and highway services is of course increased immediately
(depending upon the availability of necessary labor), but this evi-
dently is not the total effect of such activities as these. The total
effect of such forms of capital will not be apparent until alter the
new institutions have been in operation long enough for their effects
to have permeated the system.
These remarks suggest that the capacity creating effects of a
given investment may be very difficult to determine. It also means
t'hat much of the simplicity of the capital-output ratio is loat, and
it becomes necessary to introduce such slippery and unmanageable con-
cepts as external economies, social overhead facilities, and other
notions that can be handled only in a very loose, general way. It
further means that the simple application of the laws of diminishing
returns and variable proportions to a growing capital stock viewed
as a homogeneou swhole is at best a great oversimplification, and
17
at worst may lead to results that are misleading. Evidently not only
is the composition of the new investment relevant, but more importantly--
and more difficult to pin down--the relation of the composition of the
new capital to the composition of the existing stock must be taken
into account. If this is recognized it becomes unpleasantly clear
that capital creation in a given interval of time may have any number
of effects on the capacity of the system to increase output in succeeding
periods, and upon the capacity of succeeding capital accumulation to
affect capacity.
The other supply parameter--the saving function--has of course
been the subject of countless articles and books. Conceptually it poses
fewer problems than the capital-output ratio, but there is one point
to which reference should be made in the current context, Our interest
in saving arises out of the fact that it is necessary in order to release
resources from producing for current consumption, so that they may be
used to produce products that will increase the capacity of the system
in the future. But evidently there are many forms of expenditure
usually classified as consumption expenditure, that have an effect
on the future capacity of the economy. This is especially true of
spending on education and health services, but it is also true of
other consumption expenditures as well. This means in effect that
savings as usually computed do not measure the total amount of resources
devoted to increasing the capacity of the economy. 14 Therefore, the
14one of the major differences between consumption expenditures in
high income countries and in low income countries is that only a very
18
ambiguity with respect to saving--for the growth problem--may be ex-
pected to contribute to the ambiguity and unpredictability of the capital-
output ratio, and so on the behavior of the capacity of the economy
through time,
On the desmand side of the problem, little need be said about the
consumption function. Conceptually it is unambiguous, although of
course many writers question its use as a parameter in any kind of a
model.
With respect to the demand for capital accumulation the chief
conceptual problems are concerned with the appropriateness of the
acceTerator and the distinction between induced and autonomous investment.
A detailed account of the accelerator is unnecessary for our purposes
here, and we need mention only one point 15
The literature seems to concentrate on the tEchnological relationship
between output and capital. Thus the equation is usually 'written as:
4) It =b'(Y - )
or
5) It =b' (Yt1 
- Y t-2
where b' and b"' refer solely to the technological requirement of capital in
small proportion of total consumption outlays in the latter countries
affect capacity, while in the former countries surely the percentage
is of considerable magnitude.,
15
Autonomous investment was omitted from the equational system
outlined above simply for ease of exposition, and because we later
rule the concept out entirely. The literature on the accelerator is
vast indeed and references are hardly necessary: see Hamberg op. cit.
Many writers of course are reluctant to use it as an acceptable theory
of investment,,
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the productive process, These relations express the notion that in-
come
come has increased, and this increase then induces investment. For
such equations to be meaningful it is necessary to assume that it is
possible to increase output briefly with no increase in capital stock,
Firms maintain a rate of output higher than the optimum, given their
capital stock, for a period or two then increase capital accumulation
to re-obtain the optimum relation between stock and output. The argu-
ment is based on purely technological considerations. a given rate of
output requires a given stock of capital, therefore if output rises
new capital must be created. This kind of argument implies that in-
vestment demand is an automatic response to technological needs.,
The other way of looking at the accelerator involves something
more. One of two changes may be made, Rather than thinking of invest-
ment as responding to a previous change in output, it may be argued
that entrepreneurs estimate demand for output in the next period, and
invest according to their expected needs, We would then write
A
I ~-b'" (Y -Y )
t t+l t
where Yt+1 is estimated income in the t+lth period.16 Or we may argue
that the change in income between periods results in entrepreneurial
activity, but that behavior is induced by many factors in addition to
6This is the way the accelerator is written in Paul G, Clark,
"The Telephone Industry: A Study in Private Investment," in Wassily
Leontief , et. al. Studies in the Structure of the American Economy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), Chapter 7.,
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technological considerations. Thus It = b (Yt - Y1), where the b
is the relation measuring investment response to changes in output,
and of course involves primarily expectations created by the difference
betwen Y nd ~ 12between Y t and Yt-. These last two equations are therefore quite
similar with respect to the kind of phenomenon they represent: they
both make it clear that the investment decision is something more
than an automatiC technological response
Earlier we wrote the capital stock adjustment theory in such a
way that the capital-output ratio and investment demand parameter had
to be different if equilibrium growth were to be attained. Under this
form of the model it is possible to interpret the b as a technological
parameter although there must be an assumption as to entrepreneurial
expectations explicitly stated. However it seems much more rewarding,
in spite of the increased difficulty, to look upon the b as a behavioristic
parameter with certain technological limitations and not as merely a
technological coefficient handed to the economist by the engineer. If
we do this we are required in addition to say something more about
the determinants of investment decisions. This we do later. The
point here is that there must be a clear indication in the investment
equation as to whether the accelerator is a purely technological
parameter or whether it is a behavioristic parameter as well; and, as
we just observed, the notion accepted in this essay is that it is a
behavioristic parameter with certain technological limitations.1 7
17This interpretation seems to be consistent with numerous writers.
See for example Joan Robinson, The Rate of Interest and Other Essays (London:
MacMillan and Co., 1952) and Fellner, op. cit.
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Finally there remains to be mentioned the catch all, autonomous
investment, It is usually defined as investment that is not induced
by changes or expected changes in output.- Besides a virtually insur-
mountable measurement problem there is also a conceptual problem.
Evidently all increases in capacity are made with the expectation
that output will be increased in sone future period, Indeed if we
make the period short enough all investment is autonomous as investment
plans are not changed in response to hourly or daily changes in sales,
and similarly if we make it long enough there is no autonomous investment. 1 8
Besides these difficulties it seems completely inappropriate to
introduce an unexplained "trend" of autonomous investment into a growth
model. Especially does it seem unsatisfactory to assume a trend of
investment that behaves independently of short-run fluctuations or that
is a constant percentage of total income.19 The notion of autonomous
investment means that some part of investment is outside the explanatory
system, and if such investment constitutes a large proportion of
total investment then evidently the explanatory system is of little
use. It is tempting for example to argue that it is only with respect
to working capital that induced investment has a precise and unambigucous
18
R F. Harrod, "Notes on Trade Cycle Theory," Economic Journal
Vol. LXI (June 1951), pp. 261-275.
19 J. R. Hicks in hi& A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950) makes autonomous investment proceed
at a constant percentage rate and Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1949) assumes it a constant percentage of
income. Hamberg finds in its behavior the chief source of instability;
he relates it chiefly to innovations.
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meaning and therefore to apply the accelerator only to this type
of capital accumulation leaving other investment as autonomous.
But as just noted, this leaves a large segment of investment un-
explained and reduces the usefulness of the theory. We may conclude
that autonomous investment in the sense of unexplained investment
has no place in a theory of growth.
With respect to each parameter the further question must be
asked as to whether the process of growth itself results in its
changing in a systematic, predictable fashion.20 It would seem
beyond a doubt that none of the parameters used above is completely
independent of the performance of the system through time if income
is rising. Therefore, if we are to understand the behavior of per
capita income over time, it becomes necessary to deepen the explanatory
system to the extent that these immediate determinants of growth
are themselves explained, at least to the extent that these determinants
are functions of the growth process. However, before proceeding to
this task it is useful to examine further the equilibrium path defined
by the theory outlined a few pages back.
As we have seen equilibrium growth will be achieved if income
and capacity grow in such a way that the desired capital-output
ratio is constantly effective, and under present assumptions this
means capacity and income must grow at the same percentage rate. If the
2 01f the parameters change in a random, haphazard fashion there
isn 't much to be done (except seek other parameters). The kind of
changes that we will seek to discover later are those that arise
systematically as a result of the growth process.
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economy were visualized as one giant firm then the equilibrium path
has a clear meaning. The firm anticipates a market for an increased
output, and to meet this growing demand it invests; and by so doing
it increases capacity at the same time that it generates the necessary incre-
ment of demand. If it is assumed that all firms are exactly alike,
and each entrepreneur expects the demand for his product to increase
at the same rate in the future that it has in the past and so seeks
to increase capacity by the necessary amount, then the situation is
essentially the same as if there were only one large firm. In this
case all firms would grow at the same percentage rate.21 But if
entrepreneurs are assumed to have different expectations then it must
be possible for firms to be expanding at different rates, and the
achievement of equilibrium requires the remarkable event that the
weighted average rate of growth of the individual units equals the
equilibrium rate. Though this is conceptually possibly, it is indeed
unlikely and more importantly, there is no force in the economy that
tends to achieve this result.22 And as we have already observed the
equilibrium path if achieved is unstable. We reach the unhappy conclusion
2 1 Cf. Peter Newman, "A Property of Mr. Harrod's Dynamic Model,"
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XXII(l) (1954-1955)-pp. 70-71.
22
More accurately no force within the theory that tends to achieve
this equality. One might for example introduce monetary and fiscal
policy into the analysis and show that such policy may produce that
equality.
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then that equilibrium growth is achieved only by accident, and, if this
accident occurs, equilibrium will be maintained only if no shock occurs
which knocks the system off that path.
We would therefore emphasize again the characteristic of this
kind of equilibrium: in no sense is it (nor does anyone claim for it)
a time path describing what the actual behavior of an economy may in
fact be. It is unstable and the path of instability is not specified,
nor can it be specified with the tools and concepts described in the
previous section. As our primary concern is with the time path of
income, it is necessary to seek a way of interpreting the model to
make it more appropriate as a device to explain such a time path.
The equilibrium rates of growth were found to be s/k for capacity
and for income (therefore k a b-s) on the assumption that theb-s
parameters of the theory were constant. This means of course that
growth is defined in terms of one input, capital, and nothing is said
about the employment of labor. If input coefficients are assumed
constant, there is not much more that can be said since then the rate
of growth of total output is limited by the rate of growth of the
23
Mrs. Robinson in her book (The Rate of Interest and Other Essays
p. 92) suggests the path should not be called an equilibrium path,
but rather a path that is free from internal contradictions. See
also T. C. Schelling, "Capital Growth and Equilibrium," American Economic
Review, Vol. XXXVII (December 1947) pp. 864-876.
2 4 Hicks of course seeks to devise a theory that will do just
this. See his book previously mentioned and his review of Mr. Harrod's
book in Economica, Vol. 16 (May 1949), pp. 106-121.
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input whose supply is growing at the slower rate. If we rule out
excess capital capacity in the long run, it is possible only for the
rate of growth of population to exceed the rate of growth of capital
and therefore unemployment to prevail. With constant input coefficients
the equilibrium rate of growth will be the full employment of labor
rate of growth only if the rates of growth of capital and labor are
equal.25 And with the assumption of constant input coefficients and
a constant saving-income relationship we may define quite clearly the
maximum rate of growth that an economy may achieve. On the other hand
if we admit substitutability there arises difficulty with respect to
what the maximum rate of growth is, and also what is happening to
employment. The question of substitutability therefore is of con-
siderable impoktance.
The simplest way to introduce substitutability is to assume the
textbook form of a production function and textbook behavior of factor
prices.26 Under these assumptions changes in the relative supply of
factors result in changes in their relative prices, ,and this in turn
results in a change in the proportion in which the factors are used.
25
The possible distinction between a full capacity rate of growth
and a full employment of labor rate of growth has been emphasized by
hamberg , op. cit. passia.
26The most elegant treatment of a variable proportion form of the
capital stock adjustment theory is that of Robert Solow, "A Contribution
to the Theory of Economic Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. LXX (February 1956), g. 65-94. See also H. Pilvin,"Pull Capacity
vs. Full Employment Growth,. ibid., Vol. LXVII, pp. 545-552.
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With such a perfectly flexible system, deviations from the equilibrium
would set in motion forces that would tend to alter the parameters
of the equations in such a way as to produce a return to equilibrium
or, more accurately, to produce a new equilibrium path. Thus there
in always some capital-output ratio or some saving-income ratio that
will prodnee equilibrium. Under these conditions the equilibrium
path of growth becomes in effect stable, where stability is meant to
refevr to 1e Condition that a new path is established i mediately that
is consistent with the desired k and the desired a,
This position requires two things: first it is necessary for
capital costs and labor coats to change in the prescribed way as the
relative supplies of capital and labor diverge. And secondly, it is
aecessary for the productive process to change in response to the
change in relative costs of inputs. There seems little question but
that such adjustments cannot occur vith sufficient rapidity to eliminate
deviations from equilibrium in the shortrun, And equally there seems
little doubt that over a longer period of time adjustment of 'parameters'
will occur, It seems best then to try to find an in between position
that is a bit more realistic than either *perfect' substitutability
or no substitutability at all. We therefore accept the proposition
that there is at all, times an optimum input mix which optimum is a
function of technology and relative prices of the inputs. When devi-
ations from such an optimum combination of inputs develop their relative
27
prices and/or technology begin to change in such a fashion as to restore
equilibrium.27 Since neither supply of inputs nor technology can
adjust immediately the system will not be constantly in equilibrium,
but neither is it uselessly unstable as there are limits within which--
during any short-run interval--the coefficients can move; and since
we allow for equilibrating movements of both technology and input
prices, the investigation of the determinants of the optium values
of the input coefficients is a meaningful thing to do and so too is
the investigation of the time path of income traced out by such coef-
ficients.
An additional word on the rate of change of the level of employment
is useful. An overabundance of capital in the long-run is unlikely
since the supply of capital can hardly be considered independent of
the demand for it except for a given moment of time;28 the same certainly
is not true of the labor force (except possibly under extreme LMalthusian
conditions). It is evident in many countries that labor is unemployed
2 7 The assumption that the parametors are rather flexible, rather
than iron-fisted rulers of the system, is a major part of Professor
Fellner 's argument (op. cit. passim). See also R. M. Goodwin, "Secular
and Cyclical Aspects of the Multiplier and the Accelerator," in Income,
Employment and Public Policy' Essays in Honor of Alvin Hansen (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co. 1948) pp. 108-132.
28Robert Eisner, "Underemployment Equilibrium Rates of growth,"
American Economic Review, Vol. XLII (March 1952), pp. 43-58 works out
the implications of the assumption that entrepreneurs continue to
accumulate capital in spite of existing idle capacity. The analysis
has certain interesting results but the basic assumption seems to be
so contrary to fact as to be of little applicability.
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because savings do not permit a rate of capital accumulation sufficient
to provide employment for all those willing to work. Such a situation
as a long-run characteristic of an economy implies that input coefficients
are to some extent fixed or that input prices do not move in such a
way -as to bring about the change in the combination of inputs necessary
to achieve full employment. We can admit this kind of limitation an
the adjustment process by saying that there are extremes that the
adjustment process cannbt handle. One such extreme is the current
problem in many low-income countries where the factor proportions are
such that no adjustment of input prices could possibly eliminate un-
employment. This situation means that capital may grow more rapidly
tlan the labbi force without producing diminishing returns to capital
until the reserve army of unemployed is exhausted. Another extreme
that would prohibit adjustment could result from a peculiar behavior
of technology, and this we discuss later. Therefore although continued
full employment is not a necessary condition for equilibrium growth,
the assumption is made that the capital-output ratio tends to adjust
in response to different rates of growth of capital and labor in such
a way that more of the relatively abundant factor is used in the
productive process.30
An interesting aspect of this problem of especial relevance
for underdeveloped countries may be found in R . S. Eckaus, "Factor
Proportions in Underdeveloped Areas," American Economic Review, Vol. XLV
(September 1955), pp. 539-565.
30Professor Domar solves the problem by defining his capital-
output ratio as the one obtaining with full employment.
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There are additional problems of adjustment having to do with
the composition of output. As pe a income the composition of
output may be expected to change and this imposes upon the system the
necessity of moving resources among industries and possibly geographically.
Under these conditions to increase output requires not only an increase
in capital stock but an increase in a particular kind of capital stock.
Thus because of the purely physical relationships between inputs and
outputs, today's outputs are tomorrow's inputs, and unless today's
outputs are consistent with the demands for tomorrow's inputs then the
system cannot function at all and certainly cannot grow.31 Relaxation
of the assumption of constant input coefficients lessens the problem
but does not eliminate it. And even if we assume a price system that
works relatively smoothly, there will be delays and short-run bottle-
necks that constitute barriers to continuous and equilibrated growth.
The point here is that because of these "structural problems" we need
more information than is available in the aggregative form of the capital-
stock adjustment theory to determine the conditions for stable growth.
Sectors of the economy grow at divergent rates, and their responses
to changes in national income vary considerably among each other and
3This is emphasized in great detail by Adolph Lowe, "A Structural
Model of Production, . Vol. 19 (June 1952), pp. 135-176
and the same author 's "Structural Analysis of Real Capital Formation,"
in Moses Abramovitz (editor) Capital Formation and Economic Growth (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1956) pp. 581-635.
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through time, We suggest two Ings at ths point, First, the re-
qu;.rements following from the reference to strtural relationships
demand capital formation to proceed at different rates among the
Aeveral sectors. And secondly, investment decisions are ,o complex
4nd vary so widely among sectors, that it seems essential to seek a
th eory of investment vhich is much less aggregated and recognizes
the differeat forces that play on the different sectors of the system.
It is useful to regard the theory contained in the equational
system discussed earlier in this section as a "short-run growth theory."
Over a shor t -run iuteral the assumption of a constant g, k, and b
are perhaps reasonable approximairn to reality, and their magnitudes
may contaii the explanatio f tho fal lure of the system Lo behave
satislacto'ily;32 But over a iag period of time these same parameters
are surely responsive to forces released by the growth process, and
these responses and these forces must be examined and understood if
33
. theory P realty a !cong-run theory To do tias hto*ever it is
necessary to allow the parameters of this theory to become in effect
variables, adjusting to the chaanging compositlon of total output,
changing relative supplies of inputs, changing "aving habits, and
3 21t may be noted that in discussing his theory in 1951 Harrod
chose to call his article "Notes on the Trade Cycle" (See note 18 above)
3 3 1It appears that few nee policy implications are to be found
in the dynamized Keynes that were not also contained in the timeless
Keynes theory, Perhaps this is to be explained in terms of the fact
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changing circumstances affecting the relationship between investment
demand and growing output. The problem nov is to examine the behavior
of these "parameters" over time, and how that behavior is reflected
in the time path of per capita income. The discussion of the short-
run 'theory has made clear two things that are of use in a longer-run
analyis aand to which attention will be devoted in succeeding sections.
Sthe firse place it has indicated the resquements that must be met
it the system is to achieve smooth-non-flucuating--growth, and
secondly it has revealed the proximate prime mover of an economy,
entrepreneinial activity.
We may now proceed to examne what current thinking has to offer that
will enable us to make a long-run grovth theory out of this short-run
growth theory. It is helpful to begin with disaggregation,
that the capital-stock adjust~ment theory proceeds ao nearly in a purely
Keynesian model that nothing new is rev-aled by the naw theory that is not
really contained in the Keynes ' treatmeut it f The most notable ex-
ception to this statement is Professor Doiar's proposition (contained in his
Econometrics paper, note 7 above) that if the governmzent guaranteed that the
equilibrium rate of growth of income (for Domar this also means the full
employment rate) would be achieved, then the private sector alone would act
in such a way as to achieve that rate The difficulty with this proposal
is that for an individual entrepreneur a guarantee that total income will
grow at a given rate may not be sufficient incentive for him to invest his
share. It would be necessary for the government to guarantee each firm that
the rate of growth of demand for its products would continue in the future as
now. Such a proposal hardly seems feasible. John G. Gurley, "Fiscal Policy
in a Growing Economy," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXI (December 1953)
pp. 523-535, suggests other new policy implications of the Harrod-Domar theory
but these are for the most part implicit in much of previous Keynesian literature.
II. Some Implications of Disaggregation
The most widely known sectoral model available is the input-output
system of Professor Leontief, and we may -make use of this system with
some slight modification as to form and interpretation.3 4
We let aj represent the tecbnical coefficient determining the
amount of the product of industry i absorbed by industry j per unit of
output of j. The a's are measured in terms of per dollars worth units;
i.e., for every dollar of output of J, a dollars of output i are used,
Now if we assume given and tuchanging prices, X is the total output
of the jth sector measured in money units but also of course representing
real output. Therefore a X represents the total payments of industry
j to industry i for a given interval of time for a given flow of output X
If the jth industry wishes to increase its capacity, this may
require purchase of i 's products to increase J's capital stock, Let
b be the investment demand coefficient of industry j for i 's products
34See Part I of the Leontief volume cited in footnote 16. See
also two papers by R. M. Goodwin: "The Multiplier as a Matrix,"
Economic Journal, Vol. LIX (December 1949), pp. 537-555 and "Static
and Dynamic Linear General Equilibrium Models," in Iput-Output Relations
(Leiden, Holland: H. E. Stenfort Kroese N. V., 1953) pp. 68 ff. It
is emphasized that we are using this system for a specified purpose
and therefore do not discuss many complex and intricate problems that
arise in the use of such a high-powered machine. In fact we are using
the formal apparatus itself in a purely descriptive manner,
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indicating how an increase in the rate of output of the jth sector
affects the demand of that sector for i's products as capital stock.
The b's are measured in the same terms as the a's. If X represents
the capacity output rate, then we may write b (Xjt - X ) to represent
the total payments of industry j to industry i for a given increase
in capacity of J. Thus b is the equivalent of the economy-wide bii
except here it is applicable to a single sector.
The total receipts of the Ith sector is simply tme sum of the
a iXit 's and the b (X - X ) 'a, while its total outlay is the
sum of the a Xit 's and the b (X - X it-1) 's. Thus we may describe
the economy divided into k sectors in terms of a set of balance equations
written in the following way:
6) X * - + %b (x X, X ,)
Written in this way we have a closed system, that is one with no given
final bill of goods. This means that included in the k sectors is the
household sector, and that we assume that the input of consumption
is a necessary requisite for the output of labor. If this is accepted
then we may look upon all the a's not only as input requirements per
unit of output--technological relationships--but we may also look upon
them as indicating the amount of output which must be "consumed" in
order to produce the total output. Thus cu '"consumption" is required
for the production of the remaining Xi. output.35 We are in effect
3 5The I A, is the matrix of a 'a and X is a vector. The X is
an identity matrix corresponding to ity in Icalar algebra. Solow (see
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saying that just as we may interpret the household sector in terms
of an input of consumption and an output of labor, so we may interpret
the other sectors' inputs in terms of consumption. The system of
equations 5 may then be considered a disaggregated version of equation
3 in the previous section.
We may then think of the a9 as the marginal and average propensity
to consume, and /1.w- as the proportion of output of the ith sector
th
not required to produce the flow of output of the j- sector. If X
exceeds d )( then evidently not all of K is being used as
th
inputs for the flow of X3 , and equilibrium in the I- industry requires
the condition:
7) /z- / i = bj (X X -
This is to say that the amount of X not consumed in the flow of output
of X must be used by X in additions to the capacity of the latter
industry. The equilibrium condition expressed by equation 7 is the
disaggregated equivalent of the equilibrium expressed earlier for the
economy as a whole;36 if each sector is in equilibrium then the system
in its entirety is in equilibrium. However, now instead of a single
valued parameter for the capital-output ratio and the investment demand
footnote 5) discusses the rationale of interpreting the a's in terms of
consumption and of writing the Leontief system as identical with the
Harrod model.
3 6 It seems unnecessary to introduce a supply equation explicitly.
One of course is implied in equation 7.
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function, we have a matrix of k's and a matrix of b's indicating that
different sectors of the economy have different capital requirements
and That uLvestuaat useuac a in s r Gaetv.;is retptntis tiff~vely
to changes in the rate of its output. This disaggregation is useful
in several respects.
If we write the investment equationj in the jth industry as'
8)I. = Eb> - )>. - X. )
where the b is a purely technological coefficieit,, then we have
ruled out disturbances in the system because of investment in the
'wrong' sector. This equation states--as did the aggregative equation
in the previous section (equation 4)-that entrepreneurs act after
the increase in demand for their product has already occurred, and
therefore we may expect the new capital to be created in the sector
where the demand increase has become effective. If however we recognize
here, as earlier, that b is a behavioristic as well as technological
coefficient then clearly mistakes and miscalculations are not at all
unlikely.. But independent of mistakes and miscalculations, investment
may turn out to be malallocated because of changed conditions between
the time the investment is initiated and the time the increased output
results. This may be due to many things not the least of which is the
fact that investment in the sane industry is being undertaken by different
and uncoordinated entrepreneurs, and this may result in entrepreneurs
proceeding to invest in sectors that will become oversupplied very
quickly, This suggests the proposition that the system may deviate
36
from equilibrium not only because of the inappropriate level of total
investment in relation to total saving, but also because of investment
in the 'wrong' sector.37 This in turn suggests that equilibrium
requires nuot only the aggregative equality between intended savings
and intended investment, but also it requires a "balance" among the
several sectors of the economy with respect to the demand, supply,
and technological relationships prevailing in the growing system.
More <n tais point ini a moment, A further commtent or two seems useful
dt other information revealed by the sectoral model.-
We managed to make the aggregated capital stock adjustment theory
stable by permitting the parameters to adjust, ie, to become variables,
The disaggregated model suggests another reason why such a system may
be relatively stable,38 Sup-pose that sector 3 experiences an increase
in output greater than expected with the result Lhat the capital output
ratio fails below optimum, Entrepreneurs will seek to eliminate this
non-optium condition by accrumulating more capital relative to the
existing rate of output. In the fgative or  of this'theory this
attempt resulted in more demand, and therefore the capital stock re-
mained below the desired level, For a single sector however the story
This is a key point in the model of growth developed by W. W. Rostow
See his The Process of Economic Growth (New York: W. W, Norton and Co.
1952) especially Chapters 5 and 6, We shall make considerable use of this
argument in the following sections.
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For a more analytical discussion of the stability of a matrix
multiplier-accelerator model see the Goodwin papers cited in note 34.
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may be different. The consumption (as defined above) induced by the
increased income generated by Sector 3 's investment could all be directed
toward sectors other than 3. Thus in the immediate period Sector 3
would be able to reestablish the desired ratio between capital stock
and output. However the demand--both flow and stock demand--for the
other sectors' output has risen, and to meet this increased output
it is unlikely that none of Sector 3's products would be required.
Under these conditions the instability of Sector 3 exists, but the
existence of a substantial lag may serve as a dampening device. And
this may be sufficient to eliminate the instability by virtue of revised
expectations. Evidently of course idle capacity in sectors other
than 3 would also tend to make Sector 3 (and the system as a whole)
stable. It seems fair to say that there is a stabilizing factor here
that is not evident in the aggregative model; namely that of lags
while the increased expenditures make their way through the system.
This gives all sectors a chance to revise expectations and entrepre-
neurs an opportunity to revise investment plans in accordance with
the new situation.
The multi-sectored model is revealing in other respects. In the
first place it shows clearly what may be referred to as the supply
problem. In the aggregative model all we had to worry about was the
total supply of labor and capital. But now we face the problem of
getting the factors into the appropriate sector (and out of the inap-
propriate sector). Little need be said about finance. In a country
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with a highly developed money and banking system there seems to be only
a small problem in getting funds to the sector requiring them. Therefore
the relevant supply of savings is still the total national savings
and isag ssay,,39and disaggregation here seems necessary
With labor of course the story is different. Labor immobility--
both geographical and industrial--is sure to be a significant problem
in situations where sectors of the system are growing at different
rates and especially where some sectors are growing and others are
declining. Several writers have indicated reluctance to attach much
importance to labor supply as a ceiling on the overall rate of growth
of the economy,40 But it does seem evident that particular skills
do frequently constitute significai barriers to the rate of growth
of given sectors, and because of the interdependence of thet system
this can have an effect on the economy's overall rate of growth as
well as Its equilibrating tendencies. Indeed it is frequently the
labor mobility problem--as opposed to an overall labor shortage--that
creates the inflationary situation in advanced countries experiencing
economic growth. Similarly inadequate labor mobility may be a major
problem io eliminating unemployment without first producing a rising
price level,41
39 C2 Mrs,, Robinson's remarks on this in her The Rate of Interest
and Other Essays, pp. 86-87 The situation may not be the same in low in-
come counttries where the banking system is ill-equipped and unorganized. More
on this later.
40
.See especially the several reviews of Hicks" book on the trade cycle,
A useful and o tive quantitaive study of labor mobility
39
A final characteristic of the multi-sectored that is of great
importance concerns the nature of the solution of the set of equations 6.
Assuming the supply requirements met and equilibrium maintained, the
solution to these equations is 4 2
9)2 XLJ 2cI ,hilc ' * c hi-' C+n i
A numerical solution would involve estimating the value of the -
roots ----\the coefficients hil hi 2, ----- h and
C , c 2 , ----- c 3 . The s and the h's depend on the a's and b's,
and the C's reflect the initial conditions of the system. The path
of X will be dominated by the largest root, and after a sufficient
period of time the equation may be written simply in terms of the ex-
pression containing this largest root. The relative size of the outputs
of any two sectors would be the same through time, and therefore the
rates of growth of all sectors would be the same. This of course is
commonsease. With constant a's and b's over a long period of time,
no industry may grow more rapidly than the rest of the system as all
sectors must keep pace in order to supply the inputs necessary for the
given industry to grow at a specified pace. If the a's and b's remained
is William H. Miernyk, Inter-industry Labor Mobility (Boston: Northeastern
University Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 1955).
4 2 The equation here is written as if 6 were a differential equation.
This is simply for convenience and no change of interpretation is involved.
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constant long enough for the dominant root to assert itself the economy
will be getting larger and larger while all sectors maintain their
position relative to other sectors and to total output.4
But evidently over a long period of time--one long enough for the
dominant root to assert itself--the a 's and b 's will change, changing
the roots and coefficients in Equation 10. The effect on the rate of
growth of X I;depends then upon how the a's and b's change. However,
it is also clear that in a shorter period of time the effects of the
a s and- b 's may be washed out by a high rate of growth in a single
sector of the system. For example suppose that because of a shock
to the system--in the form say of an unexpected invention--Sector g
begins to grow at a rate much higher than other sectors. Even though
the a 'a and b 'a are relatively small, the high rate of growth ofig Iig
X would overcome the effect of the a's and b's with the result that
g
the growth of other sectors tends to be affected by the behavior of
X itself rather than the set of a's and b's appropriate to it.
g
We may say then that X tends to "carry" the system for a given interval
of time. Under this condition smooth, undisturbed growth is almost
impossible without "perfect knowledge," but more important for our
4 3 This is essentially the kind of model used by John V. Neuman,
"A Model of General Economic Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. XIII(l) (1945-46) pp. 1-9. See also Robert Solow and Paul A. Samuelson,
"Balanced Growth Under Constant Returns to Scale," Econometrica,
Vol. XXI (July 1953) pp. 412-424.
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purposes it suggests the need for a theory of the behavior of individual
sectors and an investigation of the implications of this behavior for
the economy as a whole. It is to this problem that we now turn.4 4
The work of Kuznets, Burns, Frickey, and Hoffmann provide the
basic sources of data and theoretical discussion for this general
problem, and we rely heavily upon their findings and their analysis. 4 5
For those countries and for those industries for which data are available
over an extended period of time it seems reasonably clear that industries
narrowly defined tend to grow at a diminishing percentage rate. This
is to say that no one industry will continue to grow at a constant
percentage rate, but rather it may be expected to grow strongly in
the period immediately after its inception and then to taper off as
it catches up with the rest of the economy. This in turn suggests
that if total income is to grow at a fairly constant rate, some industries
must be growing more rapidly than total output while other industries
are growing at a rate less than that of total output. This means
that at any one period of time there are a few industries that are
experiencing vigorous and rapid development and in effect holding the
economy at its rate of growth. This rapid rate of growth however does
not continue indefinitely. Rather it begins to tail off toward the
4 4 Leontief, op. cit., Chapter 3.
4 5Simon Kuznets, Secular Movements in Production and Prices,
(New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1930); Arthur F. Burns, Production
Trends in the United States Since 1870 (New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1934); Edwin Prickey, Economic Fluctuations in the
United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942); and Walther
G. Hoffmann, British Industry 1700-1950 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955).
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level of the rate of growth of income as a whole and eventually to fall
below that rate, and possibly to decline in absolute terms. To shoulder
the burdea of maintaining the rate of growth of total output it is
necessary for a new or another industry to experience a rate of growth
higher and stronger than that of the economy as a whole.
The theoretical support of this empirical material rests on arguments
as to behavior of demand, population, and technology. These may be
briefly outlined. The population argument is simple. Assuming that
population growth is an independent variable and that its rate of growth
is declining, then this fact may be expected to produce the decline in
the rate of growth of a single industry once it has reached its optimum
size within the economy. This means in effect that a new industry is
formed, grows rapidly until it reaches a size that, given the level
of income of the society and the members of that society's preference
functiou, it is producing at the rate that equals the rate at which
the product is being absorbed by iLnputs in other sectors of the system.
When this point is reached the growth of the industry is dependent
entirely upon population growth, and as It is declining so the rate
of growth of output of the industry must be declining.
But this is hardly a sufficient condition since per capita income
is rising and may well counter the influence of the declining rate of
population growth. Therefore something has to be said about the behavior
of demand. The simplest hypothesis to make is that the demand for a
single product or type of product has a definite upper limit, and that
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no matter what happens to per capita income the rate of growth of demand
for a given product will not increase beyond that promoted by population
growth. This upper limit is in many cases difficult to define--impos-
sible to measure--but surely it does exist for all products,, Therefore,
if population growth is small--or zero--then it is necessary for the
rate of growth of output of a single new industry to decline after it
esatehes u with the system as a whole,
It is primarily this hypothesis about demand that is used to account
for the change in the composition of output as an economy grows.
The arg.ent has been used chiefly to explain the decline in the relative
role of gYricultural products in total output that seems to accompany
the deve.opment of an economy from comparatively low per capita income
to comparatively high per capita Income. Thus as per capita income
rises the relative increase in demand for agricultural products is less
than that of income The supporting argument is that demand for agri-
cultural products may be completely satisfied, and that as income
continueh to rise it will be devoted to the purchase of non-agricultural
products, This results in the development of new industries--usually
referred to as secondary industries--to supply the demand that arises
as a con.sequence of income being high enough that resources are available
after necessary agricultural commodities have been produced(, And if
income continues to rise, demand will tend to become effective in
service-- tertiary--industries.46 It is to be emphasized that although
4 6 Too much emphasis has probably been devoted to an effort to
classity industries as primary, secondary, and tertiary The key
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both secondary and service industries grow at the expense of agricultural
activity, within each of the two growing sectors new products must be
formed to meet new demands. For just as agricultural products meet
a demand which at some level of per capita income must be inelastic,
so too must individual products in each of the advanced sectors.
Therefore the composition of output must change so that within the
secondary and service sectors new products are forthcoming. It is
not just that demand for food is income inelastic that results in a
shift of resources as income rises, but rather that the range of products
produced in agriculture is relatively limited while in secondary and
tertiary activities the range is much greater and when an inelastic
demand is hit with one product other products may be easily supplied.
This discussion of demand also suggests that in those areas where
population growth overshadows the increase in output, demand remains
at the level where it is concentrated on agricultural products and
hence the economy of most low income countries is predominantly
agricultural.
There are several impleatioms cotained in these propositions as
to the behavlar of the composition of demand.
point for our argument is that no single product has a per capita
income elasticity of unity over an indefinite range of income gnd
therefore the demand for agricultural products is at some income
level less than unity. There are numerous references with respect to
the primary, secondary, and tertiary classification. A recent one is
Martin Wolfe, "The Concept of Economic Sectors," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. LXIX (August 1955), pp. 402-420.
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In th first place as income rises and the composition of output
'e thw nature of the products that, crry' the econony change,
he $ ai the b o f the new industries way be quite differernt from
those of a type of iadustries that were previously responsible for
mainauinin the rate of growth of the system. In particular it seems
th bikely to; be quite difterent in secondary industries from
oe in : i'ary acitiities, and differen.t in tertiary activities from
Wahat they re in secondary activities MThis ray lead to several kinds
of reperesIons. It may lead to a more rapid rate of growth for the
eooonmy a; a whole, It may lead to a requirement for increased savings
in order to maintain a given rate of groth Perhap it. might be
ts.arted ti st prevailing opinian wouLd suggest 4 at 'abt we have
rai'led se' ndary industry-iight and heavy uanutfeturing, public u
utilities, etc -have in general higher b'w than do the industries
cu i t'ssified as primary As "e have seen, this mesas that in
order to it ntain the overall rate of growth of output a larger rate
"f itngr will have to- be forthcotnag., The evidence is less clear
the o in those ac1tivities isually included in the tertiary
ro 1 seems reasonable to say that for such industries the capital
oeficen~ aIr4ll be less :&an they were on the average for the secondary
activitlis This means tha if the aggregative demand problem is solved-
or i not ,IAresent-the rate of groh 'of ouiput should increase due to
£ change the compositin o outpu't'
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It may be also that the a's of the tertiary group are less than
their counterparts for secondary activities, In this event the development
of the system to the point where industries dominate its growth behavior
may also result in the industries of the primary and secondary categories
declining more rapidly than was the case with respect to the primary
activities when the secondary industries were 'carrying' the system.
The result of this is that as fewer resources are needed to support
the growth of the old established industries, more will be available
to aid in the growth of the new industries. This suggests that as
tertiary industries begin to dominate the economy, the lower a's
and b's will permit a rising rate of growth of total output. 4 7
A second factor of importance at this point h*e to do with the
general *ocial and cultural patterns that domi ite the system. As
aecondary industry develops there is an increase in the proportion of
the population living in urban areas. This comes about because in order
to carry on a manufacturing enterprise it is necessary to have a labor
force fuily committed to earning its livelihood by industrial activity, 4 8
47 bether growth should increase or saving decrease is of course
another problem.
48Cf . Bert F. Hoselitz, "Role of Cities in Economic Growth,"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXI (June 1953), pp. 195-208.
Also in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. III. October 1954
and January 1955, there is a series of papers on urbanization and eco-
nomic growth.
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And it seems clear that only urban workers are in this category .
Also in order to carry out most manufacturing techniques it is necessary
to have a group of firms together supplying the needed raw materials,
the needed finance, the needed skills, etc. We may expect that as the
level of per capita income reaches the point where demand forces
resources into areas other than agriculture, the extent to which the
population is concentrated in urban areas is increased, and in particular
the extent to which it is concentrated in other than small agricultural
villages is greatly increased.
A corrollary factor to be mentioned has reference to the occuptonal
distribution of the population, it is evident that a larger and larger
proportion of the labor force must be drawn into manufacturing and
service activities as the process of growth continues. This means
they come into contact with new ideas, and may become more adaptable
and more sympathetic to change than are those people who remain in
isolated agricultural regions., They also are in closer contact with
each other and are more importantly affected by the actions of the
society as a whole than is the agricultural population.. Also it seems
acceptable to say that for almost all societies one of the service
industries most likely to grow is education. The effects of increased
education on the system are difficult to isolate and to generalize
upon, HWever it does seem clear that as a result of education members
of society tend to examine the consequences of their actions more
carefully, and to try--at least--to act in a manner consistent with
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desired aims. This fact--if it is a fact--has relevance in many parts
of the growth process, some of which we will examine later; e.g., birth
control, job selection, political stability, etc. In addition as the
society becomes more and more devoted to formal education, it also
becomes less antagonistic toward innovations of all kinds, and less
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willing to hang on to old habits simply because they are old.
These phenomena contribute to the increased flexibility and fluidity
of the social system within which the economic system functions.
And as we shall discuss later such fluidity and flexibility are of
considerable importance in the achieving of a satisfactory rate of
economic growth.
This brings us to the technological argument as to why individual
industrie4 tend to experience a deceleration in their rate of growth.
The proposition put forth by both Burns and Kuznets is that within
a single industry the rate of technological change must decline.
In the infancy of the industry there are wide areas which are amenable
to technological improvement, but as the obvious improvements are made
it becomea more and more difficult to maintain a constant rate of innovations
so long as the basic technological framework is intact. The result
is that the cost reductions that may accompany innovations, and hence
4 9 This hypothesis is suggested by W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory
of Economic Growth, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1955) Chapters
III and IV and H. G. Barrett, Innovations: The Basis of Cultural Change,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 1953) passim. And other writers
also of course.
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Burns op. cit., Chapter IV ant' Kuznets (reference in Note 45) passim.,
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the increase in outpuit. of the product, decline, and this contribution
to growth therefore tends to result in a relative decrease in the rate
of growth of the industry. If this hypothesisq is accepted it has a
number of implicatious for the process of growth of the system as a
whole and the role of technology in that procesa, which implications
shall be discussed when we direct specific attention to technology in
g later aection,
The relevance of the preceding discusision varies with the kind
of economy being examined. For the so-called underdeveloped country
the importance of the movement of resources out of agriculture into
light and heavy manufacturing (or out of service industries into the
manifactur ing area) may be a major task, and for many reasons associated
with the institutional and social framework of such societies this
movement tself may be difficult to accomplish, For the advanced economy,
the proble'm is unlikely to be a transfer of labor and capital but rather
a problem of demand, 51
It also seems likely that the contribution that can be made to
economic growth by urbanization and the other social changes referred
to above have exhausted themselves in such countries as the United
States, Utited Kingdom, Belgium, and the like. This would suggest
that the growth of an economy in i ts early stages was facilitated by
the breakdown of certain social and cultural obatacles, while once the
5 1Perhaps the noxt group of "industries" after "tertiary" is
"leisure " Among the many problems created by such a development
would be tbat of the measurement of economic growth, but let "s not
wcrry abut this nror-
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system has reached an advanced stage the social and cultural factors
become less of an obstacle. This of course does not mean that non-economic
factors become irrelevant to a study of economic growth as the economy
becomes highly developed. The changed attitudes toward profit maximization,
toward economic security, etc., are of great relevance. Such changes
however do not seem to follow from the composition of output argument
discussed in this section, and further elaboration may be postponed
until Section V.
The disaggregation of the capital stock adjustment model has re-
vealed further characteristics of the growth process. In particular
we have seen the necessity of achieving and maintaining 'balance'
among the several sectors of the system as growth proceeds. The
equality of the rate of growth of overall demand and capacity =ast
also be matched by the same equality of the rate of growth of overall
demand and capacity must also be matched by the same equality within
each sector. If all sectors are growing at the same percentage rate,
this internal adjustment problem is of little consequence. When
however it is recognized that increases in the capacities of the
several sectors depend upon investment in these sectors, and this in
turn depends upon the behavior of independent entrepreneurs--with varying
expectations, varying periods of gestation, varying access to loanable
funds, varying degrees of efficiency--it is apparent that perfectly
smooth adjustment is most difficult to achieve. Therefore even if the
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aggregative problem is solved the system seems sure to experience
a disturbed growth process. Whether this disturbance expresses itself
in the form of a cycle depends upon the specific assumptions made as
to the response of the system to bottlenecks and/or disequilibria and
to government fiscal and monetary policy. Also, the complete inter-
dependence of the economy indicated by equations 6, 7, and 9 enabled
us to see the role of a single industry or group of industries in the
growth process. Furthermore, the introduction of specific hypotheses
as to the behavior of individual industries revealed important features
of the modus operandi of growth not available in an aggregative approach.
Finally we may say that reducing the level of aggregation also tends
to lessen the conceptual problems associated with the model.
III The Long-Run Behavior of the Bhort-Run ParaMeters
To deepen the analysis in the present context means that we
seek an explanatory system that includes as variables the 'parameters'
of the model discussed in the previous sections. We have argued that
the chief contribution of the capital stock adjustment theory is that
it provides an amination of the conditions necessary for the stable
growth of income. When we move on to attempt to explain the magnitude
of the parameters' and their behaVior through tim, we are concerned
directly with the level of income and its rate of growth over an ex-
tended period of time and only incidentally with stability.52 To do
this requires that we account for the behavior of the labor supply,
the supply of capital, the effectiveness with which they are combined,
and the extent to which they are utilized. We need therefore a theory
of population growth and of the relationship between the quantity of
labor and population, a theory of capital accumulation, a theory of
technological invention and innovation, and a long-run theory of
aggregative demand and its composition. We also need a theory ex-
plaining the relationship between the non-economic area of society
and the economic area; such a theory is particularly necessary insofar
5 2 If income is growing at the percentage rate, y, and population at
the percentage rate p, the rate of growth of E income, y', is .
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a light is shed upon entrepreneurial endeavor and the attitude of the
society toward material advancement. And all of these separate theories
must be worked into a mutually consistent whole,
It perhaps is not betraying a professional secret to acknowledge
that contemporary economics does not provide these theories in a
rigorous, well defined fashion. Nor perhaps even is there a loose
body of principles for which general acceptance may be claimed, and
almost anything that may be said as representative of current thinking
is open to dispute. It should be kept in mind in reading the following
that this is the case, and that no claim is made that we are presenting
received doctrine or even that there is such a thing as received
doctrine on the matters discussed here.
A. Population Growth
We may begin with a consideration of population. Population
theory was of course an integral part of economics until the last
decades of the nineteenth century when, along with other aspects of
economic growth, economists lost interest in it. And with certain
notable exceptions there has been little recent effort on the part of
economists to incorporate into their explanatory system a population
equation that would indicate the determinants of the behavior of popu-
lation growth. The usual practice is to consider it an exogenous
variable. It will therefore be possible to be brief. Our proble
is to try to indicate the time path of the percentage rate of growth
of population (p) and of changes in the labor force-population ratio (I/P)
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insofar as they are dependent upon the economic sector of the society.
Literature on population problems is surely without end. Happily
the United Nations has recently published a useful review of much of
this literature, both old and new, in The Determinants and Consequences
of Population Trends (New York: United Nations, Department of Social
Affairs 1953). This is at once an exceedingly impressive work and
a very sad one. It is impressive in that it includes such a treinduous
number of authors and treats them in a well-organized, coherent fashion. It
is sad because it reveals so clearly our lack of understanding and
agreement with respect to a problem that has been attracting the attention
of men ever since man became aware that there was population. Economists
of course are indebted to Professor J. J. Spengler for his work in the
area of economic-demography: see especially his essays in Harold F. Williamson
and John A. Buttrick (editors) Economic Development (New York: Prentice-
Nall 1954) Chapter III and in Haley, op. cit., Chapter 111.
54To the extent that the behavior of these parameters depends on
factors outside the growth process our analysis is incomplete. We
include such effects as shocks to the system, about which ore later.
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Population growth enters the system in two ways. In the first
place it is the chief governing factor of the supply of labor, and
therefore is of importance in accounting for the behavior of the
productive capacity of the system. In the second place population
growth affects the total and composition of demand and in so doing
evidently enters directly into the analysis of the extent to which the
growing capacity of the economy is utilized. In this section we limit
onwselves to seeking an explanation of the behavior of p and I/P.
The oldest theory of population of relevance to economic analysis
is that associated with Malthus. If we interpret Malthusianism to
mean simply a linear relationship between proportionate increases in
population and income then, ignoring the complexities of possible
lags, per capita income would remain about constant. Whether or not
it remained constant at subsistence levels of income would depend upon
the relationship itself, which in turn rests upon the 'socio-economic
institutions ' that determine the human race's reproductive habits.
Empirically this proposition does not seem to have been applicable
over the entire experience of those countries that have achieved the
most rapid rates of economic growth. If we accept the proposition
that at some point of income growth Malthus proved wrong, it seems
useful to say that the economic-demographer seeks to answer the question
as to why the population growth function changed from Malthusian to
non-Milthusian. The implication of this question is that as r capita
6(p
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income grows the "socio-economic institutions" that determine the re-
sponse of population growth to income growth change. The question then
requires that the relevant socio-economic institutions be identified
and their relationship to income growth be specified.55 Evidently in a
closed economy this requires consideration of the effect on the mortality
rate and ain the fertility rate.
The problems are simpler on the mortality side, and agreement is much
more widespread here than with respect to explanation of changes in the
eti rate The death rate fay be expected to decline very rapidly as
per capit grows from a low level. This is to be explained in the
simple terms that as per capita income rises, more resources may be de-
voted to health, sanitation, and medical activities plus the fact the
population has a more satisfactory diet and lives in more comfortable houses.
The result is that death attributed to malnutrition, epidemics, exposure,
and lack of medical care is reduced, while improved transportation and
communication help to eliminate local famines that so often in the past
have resulted in huge loss of life. There seems to be no instance in the
world where this mortality rate Pffect of rising per Sp a income has not
been operative.
The major reductions in the mortality rate that growing countries have
experienced has only to a very small degree been due to curative
55Rostow (op. cit., Chapters 1 and 2) includes among his propensities
explaining growth, the propensity to have children. Until the propensities
are more clearly established this approach seems to be simply another way
of asking the question posed in the text., For a general view of the
usefulness of the Rostow propensities see J. R. Hicks review of the
book in the Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXI (April 1953), pp. 173-174.
medicine, but rather to the control of infection and contagion and
improved environmental conditions, It seems clear however that the
impact of such factors on the death rate has reached a maximum in the
high income countries of the world, and further reductions in these
countries must depend upon advances in medicine. The resultt; diwte
suggest that such medical advances work relatively slowly once major
diseases are conquered,56 Therefore the decline in the death rate
may be expected to taper off as the advantages of sanitation, etc., are
more fully exploited and reliance for further reduction begins to rest
on increased medical knowledge. Hence we would expect the death rate
to fall rapidly but at a decreasing rate, and finally to be falling
very slowly as a system progresses from a very low per apita tncome
to a very high e gpt income 4
The determinants of the natality rate are much less easily isolated.
In general writers in this field suggest the following factors as
having a negative effect on the birth rate: 1) urbanization, 2) education,
3) occupation, 4) death rate, 5) socio-economic status. The argument
supporting each of these and its relation to peer capita income growth
is fairly simple and straightforward, 57
5 See the Spengler paper in the Williamson and Buttrick volume
pp. 98 ff,
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Numerous other factors might be mentioned: for example, im-
proved status of women, increasing number of activities open to women,
increased desire to give children an education, and so on,, See Part II
of the UN document cited in note 53,.
The effect of urbanization is at two levels. In the first place
the economic advantage of children is less in urban areas compared to
rural areas. Thus where on a farm a large family is frequently an
economic asset in that it reduces the necessity of employing outside
labor, in urban areas, where most of the population are employees,
children have low earning potential and a high cost. Given the extent
therefore that families plan their size, the purely economic considerations
would tend to make families smaller in towns and cities than in rural
areas. Also it is frequently emphasized that urban dwelling increases
the awareness of alternative outlets for income. It becomes evident
that increased family size may be achieved only at the expense of
forgoing certain (other) desirable durable assets. The rimtft meI
to be that the advantages of the other assets outweigh the advantages
of a large number of children.
In the second place urbanization results in increased awareness
of the need and capacity to limit family size. This is trua 'or several
reasons. Information circulates more easily in urban than rural areas,
vertical social and economic mobility is greater, and a greater degree
of =social flexibility in cities tends to permit a more rapid rage
of change and adaptation than does the social rigidity that characterizes
the rural areas of almost all countries. The relative greater social
fluidity not only permits but encourages urban residents to change
all their habits-including reproductive habits--in such a way that
they become more nearly consistent with the existing social and economic
environment. As such environmental factors discourage large families
in cities we expect the response of increased urbanization to be in the
form of a reduced birth rate.
Education 's role is similar to that of urbanization outlined in
the previous paragraph. There seems little doubt but that education
results in persons approaching all problems -- including marriage and
child bearing--in terms of a more careful appraisal of alternative
lines of action, and the result of this for family size and population
growth is that marriage occurs at a later age and family size is re-
duced. Since the chief factor that postpones marriage seems to be
economic uncertainty, it may be that the elimination of the fear of
unemployment, poor housing, and the like will tend to lower the average
age of marriage and this in turn may lead to a larger number of children.
However, if it is accepted that the effect of education on the birth
rate is to make family size the result of a conscious examination of
the effects, it seems safe to say that for most countries of the
world increased education will result in a reduction in the birth rate.
In those areas where it does not, we may conclude that a rising birth
rate will have no negative effect on the rate of growth of per capita
output.
The third factor referred to above, occupation, may be quickly
disposed of. The literature leans to the point of view that clerical
workers, professional workers, and workers in "tertiary" industry in
general have a lower birth rate than workers in "primary" activities.,
The explanation is essentially the same as that with respect to the
urban-rural argument. Farm life offers an economy wherein children
can begin at a very early age to earn an income; the same is not true
with respect to service industries, If economic growth is accompanied
by an increase in the proportion of the population engaged in activities
other than agriculture and mining, then this would result in a tendency
for the rate of growth of population of the society as a whole to
decline.
The proposition that the birth rate is affected by the death rate
rests on a simple assumption as to the behavior of parents. There is
evidence to the effect that parent&. think in terms of the number of
children they wish to raise to adulthood, and then have the number
necessary to achieve an acceptable probability of raising the desired
number to maturity.58 Evidently then if the death rate falls-especially
if infant mortality declines--this fact should result in a decline
in birth rate, This point gains added -merit when it is recalled that
income growth is also accompanied by increased awareness of methods
of birth control,
The effect of socio-economic status is not so easily spelled out
as were the effects of income growth on the birth rate. The evidence
is consistent with the hypothesis that the birth rate is lower in
5 8 Several societies think in terms, not of total number of children,
but of the desired number of sons. This complicates matters considerably.
social classes that are generally accepted as "higher" than they are
in those classes generally recognized as "low." Historical evidence
suggests that this has been the case throughout most of recent time
in almost all societies. It is not clear however what the net effect
of economic growth is in this connection. To the extent that a rising
per capita income results in a larger proportion of the population
moving into the "higher" classes, the rate of growth of population will
tend to decline. To the extent that any socio-economic status is only
a relative notion, and approximately the same proportion of the popu-
lation is always in the "higher" class, then a rising per capita
income may have little if any effect on the rate of growth of population
because of this factor.
However it does seem that there is some evidence that the "lower"
groups seek to emulate the higher classes insofar as they have knowledge
of the behavior of the latter group. For reasors already referred to
a rising per papit income is accompanied by wider and greater avail-
ability of information about all aspects of society. It may be argued
therefore that a rising r capita income results in facilitating the
emulation of low natality rate groups by the high natality rate groups.
Something of this "demonstration effect" may have prevailed in some
Western European countries and the United States. Even more than the
other parts of this theory of population growth, this factor is difficult
to isolate conceptually and perhaps impossible to measure.
All of these arguments, to a more or less degree , require accep-
tance of the earlier discussion as to the effect of rising E capita
incomes on the composition of output and the changes in economic
organization and institutions that accompany these changes in output.
If economic growth results in a contrary evolutionary pattern--e.g.,
if urbanization decreases rather than increases--then evidently the
effect on the rate of growth of population of a rising pr capita
income will be other than that that we have suggested here. And as
we have noted there are many demographers and economists with good
theoretical arguments and acceptable empirical materials who question
each step in our argument, and in questioning a single step they also
question the whole journey. This will be true in other places as well.
The factors affecting mortality are much more specific and immediate
than those affecting the birth rate. There appears to be no modern
society where the introduction of life-saving changes are unacceptable
once the population is aware of their effectiveness. On the other
hand, the relationship between income and the birth rate is anything
but sure, and certainly the factors isolated above will work themselves
out only very slowly compared to the speed with which the impact on
the death rate is felt,. The result is that in societies where income
is so low that the advantages of medical and sanitation facilities
are not fully exploited, and so low that a large part of the popu-
lation is ill-housed and ill-clothed that society is subjected to
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a potentially high rate of growth of population9 However if P capita
income is rising and if the structural changes outlined above accompany
the income growth, then most modern authors seem to agree that the rate
of population growth will decline at some point. The result is that
we may expect population and the labor force to grow at a declining
percentage rate over very long periods of time, 60 It may be useful
to remind ourselves that shocks to the system may temporarily distort
this pattern. Such things as wars, unusually severe and long depres-
sions or upturns, and major new discoveries of arable land may in
effect chpnge the location and shape of the growth curve,, But once
the shock has been absorbed by the system the more lasting factors
discussed above will tend to dominate the behavior of population growth
again.
The behavior of population will also affect the age composition
of the population and hence the ratio of the labor force to the population
5 9 Harvey Leibenstein, A Theor of Economic-Demographic Development
(Princeton- Princeton University Press, 1954) presents an analysis of
the difficulties a country may have in breaking out of the Malthusian
trap because of the possibility of rapid rates of growth of population
in the early stages of growth. Leibenstein has little to say in the
way of a theory of population growth however, except relating it in
an unspecified way to income.
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MaMy overpopulated, underdeveloped countries are faced with a
fearsome problem in the fact that they have such a high population
growth potential to overcome. The United Nations report suggests
that in countries where the birth rate has only recently begun to
decline, it has declined more rapidly than intghose countries where
its decline began in the first half of the 19- century. This evidence
is perhaps encouraging.
may change, Most low income countries have a relatively low labor
force-population ratio due to the high infant adolescent mortality
rate. Where population increases result from a fall in the mortality
rate due to a rising standard of living the VP ratio will tend to
rise, and this of course should facilitate raising per capita income.
On the other hand as the birth rate begins to fall as p cpt
income continues to rise, the average age of the population will
rise and may even reach the point where I/P declines because such
a large part of the population is in the retired category. Thus if
medical science increases life expectancy from 65 to 90 years without
increasing the interval during which a person is able to work then
evidently with a slowly falling birth rate, the I/P ratio will tend
to fall.
These remarks suggest a general evolutionary pattern of population
growth and age composition that seems to accompany the growth of real
Ecapita income. The population tends to pass from a high growth
potential characterized by a constant birth rate and a rapidly falling
death rate to a situation with a low growth potential where both the
birth rate and the death rate are very low, with the former slightly
larger but falling. The I/P ratio tends to be relatively low in high
growth potential situation, then begins to rise as the mortality rate
falls, and possibly to fall again as the population achieves greater
and greater life expectancy.61 We shall assume in what follows that
61This behavior of the I/P ratio may be complicated by the increase
in the number of women in the labor force. This number--in terms of
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this evolutionary pattern prevails, and consider the consequences of
such a pattern upon the functioning of the system in general and in
particular upon the capacity of the system to generate a positive
rate of growth of per capita income. It is of course a simple matter
to trace out the effect on per capita income growth of this pattern
of population behavior if we assume that there are no other repercussions
on the system. Per capita income will tend to rise slowly-possibly
decline--at first and then as population growth falls off and the
labor force-population ratio rises per capita income will tend to rise
more and more rapidly. If in later stages I/P falls again, this will
serve as a braking factor on the behavior of per capita income.
But obviously the question of interest is to seek to isolate any
possible effects of our hypothesized population behavior on other
parameters of our income growth model and to incorporate these effects
into the explanation of the time path of per capita income.
the total labor force--probably rises along with per capita income,
although possibly not because per capita income rises,,
B. The Saving-Income Ratio
The saving function in Part I was written in as simple a way as
possible; saving was made to depend only upon current income, and the
marginal and average propensity to save were assumed to and constant
through time. The problem in this section is to assume the saving
ratio to a variable, and to seek to isolate those factors that determine
its time path. It is convenient however to write the equation as
8 = s(Y - m) rather than as simply S = sY as earlier.62 This is
useful because there is reason to believe that the behavior of a is of
as much relevance to a long-run problem as is the behavior of a.
There are two problems in connection with the behavior of S/Y
that it seems useful to keep separate although perhaps the distinction
is to some degree artificial. In the first place in any economy
where the majority of the population 'receive an income well above
subsistence why does the saving-income ratio hover around the value
it does rather than (say) twice as high or half as high? The second
part of the problem is that referred to above, namely how does S/Y
change as an economy experiences economic growth? This latter question
will be discussed first, and we shall consider individual and corporate
savings separately.
6 2 We are here following Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving
in the United States, Vol. III, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1956) Part IV.
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The population pattern that we have accepted may have some effect
on the behavior of SfY. The rise in the proportion of the population
in the labor force that accompanies the early stages of income growth
may have a stimulating effect on the propensity to save, and similarily
the rise in the proportion of the population who have retired from
the labor force in later stages of income growth will have a depressing
effect on the capacity and willingness to save out of a given income.
Persons 65 and over and children under 15 or so normally consume more
than they produce, and the suggestion is that the larger these dissaving
groups are relative to the total population, the smaller will be the
capacity of the economy to save. Under these assumptions we would
expect S/Y to rise as the population characteristic of the country
changed from a relatively low I/P ratio to a higher one and then to
decline as the I/P ratio falls in response to an aging population.
The maximum S/Y ratio-so far as the population effect is concerned--
seems to be reached when the proportion of the population between the
ages 40-55 is a maximum. The argument is simply that by middle age
most families are established--houses and furniture are bought, children
are productive, and other major consumption expenditures have been
made--and retirement begins to come well within the time horizon; thus
63See James S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving, and the Theory of
Consumer Behavior, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949).
6 4 Cf. the discussion by Irwin Friend, Individuals' Saving (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1955), pp. 137 ff.
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the incentive to make consumption expenditures is falling and the
incentive to save is rising with the obvious result that the proportion
of saving to income rises.
Another effect of importance arising out of population behavior
concerns the composition of output In the high growth potential situ-
ation vith children composing a relatively large proportion of the
popu a ion a majcr share of expenditures nn Obat are usually classi-
fied cs conA,4ption items have a significant effect on the capacity
of tb system to produce. Thus expenditures on school services, health
faci ities, and the like designed to facilitate the training of young
people have an effect comparable to investment expenditures with very
lo4g gestation periods. At the end of such a gestation period the
vrkers, the training, and the improved health are, in effect, capital
equipment and should increasecapacity in some prescribed way.
Similarly in a population with an age structure that yields a
significant proportion of the population over (say) 65, expenditures
on health and welfare facilities will have no such long-run effects
on the capacity of the system. In two situatioasalike with respect
to the rate of saving, the rate of income, and the k and b matrix
but one with a high growth potential population and the other at the
opposite end with a low growth potential, the capacity of the first
system is rising more rapidly than that of the second. Given that
income of the society is such that it allows expenditures on school
services and children's health facilities, the capacity rate of growth
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will tend to rise as the population follows the path from low average
age, high growth potential to one where the average age is older and
a smaller proportion of consumption expenditures are of the kind to'
affect capacity. The rate of growth of capacity will then tend to
decline as the, age composition of the population becomes such that an
increasing proportion of the population are in the older age brackets.
There are several other (potential) propositions about the behavior
of 8/Y that can be deduced from the growth process outlined above.
We have shown reason to believe that a long period of rising per
capita income results in a shift in the occupational distribution of
workers so that the relative number of workers in agricultural activities
declines And also the over-all number of entrepreneurs--including
farmers--also will decline relative to other groups in the economy.
Both farmers and other individual entrepreneurs tend in general to
save a larger proportion of their income than do non-farmers and
employees. Te farmer is in general less in contact with new objects
and new idees than his urban-dwelling counterpart,65 and perhaps also
is under less pressure to match his neighbors in consumption habits.
For the entrepreneur, the argument is usually stated in terms of incentives
to save: since the economic life and professional and social prestige
of the entrepreneur depend to a large degree upon the success of his
business enterprise, he is under greater pressure to accumulate capital
£SThe argument could well be set in terms of urban and non-urban
dwelling units.
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to assure its success than he in to achieve recognition by his con-
sumption habits. This 'entrepreneur effect' may well be washed out by
' "profit effect' to be discussed in a moment.
Among the service activities that seem to respond to a rising
M capita income are insurance companies, saving banks, and other
financial institutions that provide available and trustworthy deposi-
tories for savings. This may lead to actual increases in the proportion
of income saved, and surely will lead to a more effective utilization
of the saving that does occur., In either case the resources made
available for investment will be increased.. The effect of these develop-
ments, however, has a deftnite ceiling, And -s likely to be of much
greater relevance early in the growth process than after per capta
Income has risen to a relatively high level, It seems clear for
example that improved saving institutions will increase the amount of
resources that may be-put at the disposal of investors in a country
like India or Ecuador, but it is doubtful if the same is true for
(say) the United States and the United Kingdom or has been true in
recent yearo ,
The hypotheses that have received the most attention have of
course been that S/Y is a rising function of the level of pr capita
income, and that the greater the inequality in the size distribution
of a given level of income the greater the amount of savings out of
that income.
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Available data show rather clearly that at a given level of
national income persons in the higher income brackets save a larger
proportion of their income than do those in the lower income groups,
and from this empirical evidence it is tempting to go on to the propo-
sition that as per capita income rises all along the line, total
saving will rise relative to income. But this is a questionable jump.
If we rule out cyclical effects and lags then this proposition means
in effect that "wants" are more nearly satisfied at higher income
levels than at lower. But surely within the range of income that now
appears attainable, this proposition has little to recommend it.
Historical experience suggests rather that "wants" vary with the
power to satisfy them, and tend to increase with knowledge of new
products and new services.66 This in turn implies that "wants" do
do not constitute a definite, finite quantity, but rather they are a
function of the extent of our capacity to exploit our economic resources.
This becomes especially true when improved communication, transport-
ation, and advertising make possible the rapid spread of information
about new consumer goods and their accessibility in all parts of the
world.
Persons in the higher income brackets at a given level of income
do save a larger share of their income than the lower income groups,
66Qualifications due to changes in values and/or social structure
will be mentioned later.
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but this is explained on grounds other then mere magnitude of income,
Most of the highest income recipients are enitrepreneurs rather than
employees anud, as we have noted, this tends to result in a high S/Y,
and probably the age factor works in this direction also, It has
also been suggested that higher income groups lead the way in creating
aew wants and in finding ways to satisfy them. Higher income groups
create the pattern of consumption, and this in turn is emulated by
lower income groups as their income rises enough to permit it. This
has lead to the rather widely accepted view that an individual's
propensity to consume (,ave) depends upon his tank in the income scale,
given his attitude toward competitive iatation of the pacesetters in
consumption 67
The effect of this set of arguments is sure to move the saving-
income curve to the right, ie,, to increase m,68 The effect on the
slope of the curve, however, seems to depend much more on the effect
of income growth on the size distribution of income rather than upon
its actual level. If at any level of income higher income groups
save a larger proportion of their income than do low income groups,
This is the hypothesis developed by Duesenberry, op,. cit, and
Franco Modigliani, "Fluctuations in the Saving-Income Ratio: A Problem
in Economic Forecasting" in Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. XI
(New York: lational Bureau of Economic Research, 1949.)
6 8 It seems unlikely that the curve moves continuously and at an
even rate, but it is difficult to formulate the exact way in which it
does move.
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the larger the share of income going to a given percentage of the
population the larger ill be the overall S/Y ratio. And if as the
system develops --as pe aita rises--income becomes more unequally
distributed then this will contribute to a rising proportion of income
saved. It appears necessary therefore to examine the behavior of income
distribution by size as the system achieves higher and higher per capita
income before a final conclusion can be drawn as to the time pathb of
individuals savings-income ratio.
Available evidence is such that few if any propositions can be
accepted with c clear conscious,69 and here more than elsewhere we
are limited to a simple, inconclusive discussion of tihe pros and cons.
We may deduce one proposition from our previous analysis. In-
equality in income distribution appears to be significantly less in
rural, agricultural areas than in urban areas and, as we have seen,
the evidence suggests that increased urbanization is a feature of
a long term growth of per capita income. The increased inequality
may be explained in terms of the larger variety of occupations iL urban
areas, and the greater concentration of ownership of earning assets.
Thus the increasing weight of the urban, relative to the ruraI popu-
70lation should ccntribute to an over-all increase in inequality.
69
A recent study in this connection is Simon Kuznets ' "Economic
Growth and Income Inequality," American Economic Review, Vol. XLV
(March 1955), pp. 1-29.
7 0 It could conceivably be offset by an increase in rural income
relative to urban income but this is unlikely.
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As we have observed earlier a very large proportion of total
saving in any country is performed by the highest income groups,.
In the United States the upper ten per cent of income recipients
account for almost the entire amount of saving.71 The cumulative
effect of this inequality in saving would be for the upper income
groups to gain an increasing proportion of income earning assets, and
this in turn should lead to further inequality in income distribution.7 2
There are two other factors that are frequently mentioned as
accompanying economic growth and acting to increase the inequality
of income distribution: one concerns the extent of monopoly and the
other the behavior of innovations.
Several writers have suggested that the degree of monopoly may
increase as income growth continues, and that increasing monopoly
contributes to a rising share of income going to profits. Monopoly
might be expected to increase with income growth for several reasons.
7 1 Simon Kuznets, Shares of Upper Income Groupa in Income and Saving
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953) p. 220.
7 2 This point is developed in detail by Kuznets in the paper cited
in note 69.
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The degree of monopoly is usually defined in terms of the
relation between price and marginal cost. The writers referred to
include Joan Robinson, Kalecki, Schumpeter, Domar, Steindl, and many
others. G. Warren Nutter has attempted to measure changes in the
extent of monopoly over time in his The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly
in the United States, 1899-1939, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1951).
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The technological requirements of large scale industry tend to raise
the minimum (and optimum) size of the firm to a point that limits the
number of firms to the extent that each has a significant effect on
the market price. This high cost of entry constitutes a barrier to the
customary competitive process by which an excess of price over marginal
cost is competed away.74 Similarly it is frequently observed that by
means of advertising, price competition is limited and replaced by
product competition which also tends to maintain and even increase
profit margins. And finally it is necessary to mention the tendency
to amalgamation and cartellization that seems to inhere in a system
of profit-seeking enterprises. The effect of monopoly is of especial
importance with respect to the behavior of the 8/Y ratio as it results
not only in growing inequality in income distribution, but that it1-
equality is also reflected in increased profits. And for reasons
previously referred to profit earners tend to save more than those
whose source of income is chiefly wages and salaries or land.7 5
74See B. S. Keinstead, The Theory of Economic Change (Toronto:
The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1948), Chapter XI.
7 5 This point is emphasized strongly by W. Arthur Lewis in his
book The Theory of Economic Growth (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1955) and his article, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies
of Labor," Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies, Vol. XXII
(May 1954), pp. 139-191.
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The empirical validity of thee several argument; is difficult
to asess, Although muchNA been wrttlen on the subject it is no simple
izitter to find an" hypothest that *eemo to represent prevailing doctrine,
otr data to support any hypothesit, Few perns would argue that an
£acreasing degre (A OfMOOIpoly ixs a JEcer -cpanion With growth,
but perhapr 1. is true that most wewern countries have experienced
increasing monopoly pressure in the course ot theIr development,
Technological development and the d-itficultIes created thereby for
the entry-or the threat of entry-of new firms is probably the strongest
argument supporting the proposition that monopoly power increases as
income groxw, and seems more nearly unlversally applicable than any
other argumaent. But even if increasing monopoltzation does accompany
growth it does not necessarily follow that there are not antidotes to
the effect of monopoly on profit margins. Both Mrs. Robinson and Mr.
gaLecki pa considerable confidence In the capacity of labor unions
to limit the profit margins of a firm despite its monopolistic power
In its selltng markets, If the labor unions are able to achieve this
result, then the effecT of monopoltization on income distribution may
be nii or at least greatly reduced,
'The etfecet of Innovaticns on income distribution depends upo.Q the
actepted hypothesis as to the pattern that innovations follow through time,
Whther monopoly does in fact increase by virtue of the growth process
depends upon government action in controlling it. The question here is not
whether th e government 4hould or nshuld not limit monopoly, but rather flether
there are factors in the structural changes accompanying growth that produce
a VLuWate increasingly favorable to monopolization
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Possible hypotheses will be examined in the next section, Without
defending the position we merely assert here that there is no very
good reason to believe that innovations have anything but a neutral
effect on income distribution,
Each argument discussed above uhhappily may be matched by an
argument supporting the proposition that the growth process creates
forces that lead to income being more equally distributed.
In hit paper cited in note 69 Kuznets discusses several such factors.,
Evidently the actions of government has in many cases resulted in
increasing equality. Such practices as inheritance and income taxes,
unemployment insurance, social security, etc., will tend to redistribute
income in favor of the lower income groups. However, there is no good
reason to believe that this particular behavior on the part of the
government is in any sense a characteristic of a growing economy.
Examples could easily be provided in which government action was the
opposite. Therefore it is impossible to count on such political
developments as a continuing antedote to the forces contributing to
increasing inequality in income distribution.
Other factors may be mentioned that may be considered more reliable.
We have argued above that growth is accompanied by a specific change
in the pattern of demand and hence in the composition of output.
This has meant that the industries dominating the growth of the econ-
omy tend to change, and the source of the largest returns on capital
change hands. The result seems to be that occupancy in the top income
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brackets is a changing rather than cumulative process. As long as a
changing structure accompanies growth, and as long as there is vertical
freedom of movement in the system, this movement in and out of the
upper brackets may tend to prevent the cumulative factors noted above
from working themselves out.
Other long-run forces apparently accompanying growth and leading
to decreasing inequality in size distribution of income may be briefly
mentioned. Wider knowledge of the labor market and increased mobility
of workers tends to reduce wage differentials among comparable jobs
and also throughout the economy. The development of extensive use of
the corporate form of business enterprise and the concomitant development
of a stock market may result in a widening distribution of the ownership
of earning assets. And finally the development of saving institutions
insurance companies, and pension plans work toward averaging income
over a longer period of time, and empirical and a priori evidence
support the proposition that life time distribution of income is less
unequal than that for a given year. 78
7 7 Euznets in his paper cited in note 69 discusses this. He also
points out that there is considerable difficulty in passing on to one 's
heirs the abilities that result in high incomes from personal services
(e.g. 1 acting, singing, etc.).
7 8 8ee George Garvy, "Functional and Size Distribution of Income
and Their Meaning," American Economic Review, Vol. XLIV (May 1954)
pp. 236-253 and the literature cited there.
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"What can be said in siummary about the behavior of income distri-
as p capita income gro? It would seem that the implicalti
our argu et suggest that in the ear1y sges of growth the factors
noking for ,,4.creasing inequalityv are i i prevai Especially
when tho %Urnization movement gets underway and manufacturing activities
begin t develop it appears that monopoly, technology, and profit
behavior al' favor the higher income groups- And it is not until
income h*us reached comparatively high levels that distribution equalizing
factora begin to be effective, If this conjecture is right-and it is
oaly a conjcuture-then we may expect income inequality to increase
intially, 'en to level off, and finally to experience a long period
slow dev e as income pe cap2A rises. To the extent that the
distributioin of income affects $SY, %,e expect S/Y to tend to behave in
a similar way7 This would mean that as income rises and the saving-
income curve moves to the right, it oill become steeper at first and
then gradually become less and less steep; i .e, in our equation S
rises and thn declines as Y and m increase.
A final factor in accounting for the behavior of S/Y through
ime that mvst be mentioned is the rate of interest. The effect of
79
Harry G. Johnson has devised a case where increased income
inequality leads to increased consumption even with customary assumptions
as to the consumption habits of the several income groups. See his
"The Macro-Economics of Income Redistribution," in Alan T. Peacock
(oditor) Income Redistribution and Social Policy (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1954)
80
changes in the rate of interest on saving is of course now customarily
doubted. If we accept the proposition that the rate of interest tends
to decline secularly as per ita income rises, this fact will surely
result in some people saving more and others less (independent of the
income effect) depending upon their motives for saving. It may be
noted however that total interest payments may be sufficiently large
so that a change in interest rates affects saving via its effect on
the distribution of income. Thus a secular decline in interest
rates occurring simultaneously with a rising er capita income would
result in the share of interest return in total product being iess
than it would have been had interest rates remained constant. Since
most interest payments go to higher income groups, this phenomenon will
tend to reduce income inequality, and therefore saving. Once more it
may be observed that such an interest rate effect on saving, to the
extent that it is effective at all, would be much more relevant in
areas where interest rates were high relatively to labor costs and
could therefore decline to a degree that the distribution effect may
be expected to be of significant proportions. As the interest rate
structure becomes so low that even over a long period of timx , is
able to change only by a couple of percentage points or so, it is
doubtful if much attention need be given even to this effect of interest
behavior on saving.
8oThis has been discussed by Harrod and Bamberg in their works
previously cited.
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A mere list of factors that might affect changes in individuals'
saving behavior through time is not very revealing unless some general
proposition emerges, and conclusions are not easy to find in connection
with saving habits. However the following hypothesis seems worthy
of attention: The factors contributing to a rising S/Y are strongest
in the earlier stages of industrialization, and as the economic system
begins to change from an essentially agricultural society to one
where other economic pursuits are increasingly important the saving-
income ratio will rise. This means that the income distribution effect
due to monopoly power and technology outweighs the effect of increased
urbanization and the effect of occupational status. However, as income
continues to rise, those factors making for a decreasing S/Y beoome
dominant and saving as a proportion of income begins to taper off and
eventually to decline. This conclusion is the same as that reached
when considering the effect of income distribution alone, and it may
be that this is the major influence operating on S/Y although surely
such developments as unemployment insurance, stock markets, increased
mobility, etc., have not been completely insignificant, nor more recently
have taxes on profits.
The question of the determinants of corporate (and government)
saving is much less explored in current literature than is individual
saving, and there is little that can be said on the subject here.8 1
A recent study of corporate saving behavior (largely concerned
with refuting the notion that the Dusenberry-Modigliani hypothesis as
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The motives -f corporations in saving are not clearly established,
but it appears unlikely that they save without reference to investment
plans Therefore an explanation of corporate saving involves an ex-
planation of corporate investment plans, and this is no mean task,
The literature and the data do suggest one hypothesis that is of
great relevance for our problem,, As corporate enterprises expand and
become more and more firmly established, they rely increasingly on
retained earnings for additional expansion and correspondingly we
expect corporate saving to rise in relation to corporate earnings.
To the extent that this is true it suggests that just about the time
that individuals are beginning to reduce the proportion of their income
that :hey gave, corporations are beginning to raise the proportion of
their income that they save.
If we accept this last proposition--that the observed constancy
of total saving over total income is due to diverse movements in
indiv iduals and corporation saving-income ratio--our previous discussion
suggests that this is of considerable relevance in understanding the
growth process, A decreasing proportion of total saving will be
available for new industries, and an increasing proportion available
for old established firms, We have argued that to a very large extent
to individual saving habits is equally applicable to corporations)
i, the paper of John Lintner in Walter H. Heller, Francis M. Boddy,
aad Carl L. Nelson (editors) Savings in the Modern Economy (Minneapolis:
University ctf Minnesota Press, 1953).
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the maintenance of a constant rate of growth of total output depends
upon the constant emergence of new firms (or at least new products),
and the gradual reduction of the rate of uncommitted savings results
in a drying up of finance available to new industries 82 The result
may be to impede the establishment of new firms that supply the necessary
lift to the system as old industries slow down in their rate of ex-
pansion. The tendency released by this trend will be to slow down the
systems of over-all rate of growth simply because available finance is in
inadequate supply to industries that can experience the most rapid
rate of growth.
The practical importance of this consideration is difficult to
appraise. Many large firms are the source of new products and in this
event undistributed profits would facilitate their development, but
of course it is easy to find exaples where established firms acted
as barriers to the introduction of new products. It is almost impossible
to find examples of industries that never developed solely because of
lack of finance, but in a highly developed economy it is surely a very
small number of potentially profitable firms that never see the light
of day because they are unable to gain access to the necessary finance.
Some further observations on this point will occur in the section on
aggregative demand.
We have been concerned to this point with an attempt to explain
changes in the saving income ratio that accompany economic growth.
82Cf. Professor Lewis' book eited in note 75.
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We have yet to ask the question why do such movements occur in the
general neighborhood of (say) five to twenty per cent rather than
twice those values.. It is clear enough why a society that is barely
able to earn subsistence saves little or nothing . And there is no
great problem involved in understanding why, as income rises above
subsistence, the population is more interested in becoming comfortable
than in saving. And changes in the proportion of income saved of the
order of teni or fifteen percentage points may well be explained in
terms of those factors already discussed. But to explain why, in
those countries where it would be possible to enjoy a relatively high
level of consumption and still save half or more of total income,
only twelve to twenty per cent is, in fact, saved it appears necessary
to introduce the general pattern of mores and the social structure
that govern all aspects of social behavior.
This ot course is what Professor Rostow seeks to do with his
propensity to consume. As we have observed Rostow's general solution
1. such that it sheds very little specific light on this problem.
Few contemporary authors have addressed themselves to the issue in any
detail, and our discussion here will be brief.
83The Process of Economic Growth, Chapters 1-3.,
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The most specific theory in this connection is that of W. Arthur
Lewis. Professor Lewis argues that the chief explanatory factor
is the class structure of society, in particular the extent to which
that structure is dominated by "capitalists." Saving, says Professor
Lewis, is not significantly affected by income distribution. as such
but rather by the proportion of income going to profits. As an economic
system develops-because of the change in the composition of output-
the role of the capitalist increases in importance. The capitalist
is a heavy saver because (as we noted above) he has a good reason
to save and does not need to engage in conspicuous consumption to
impress his neighbors. The profit maker knows that his power lies
in increased command over finance, and rather than seeking to increase
his land holdings, or his political prestige, or his religious standing,
he seeks to accumulate more and more productive assets. To do this
he must save. But the capitalist class cannot grow indefinitely, and
as it becomes larger real wage rates begin to rise, profit rates show
a leveling off or a declining tendency and the incentive and capacity
on the part of the capitalist to accumulate further is reduced. This
analysis leads to a pattern of saving in which /Y rises as the economy
develops from agriculture dominated (run by peasants and absentee
landlords) to industry dominated (run by capitalists). When the
Op. cit., Chapter V.
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capitalist sector has reached its optimum size--determined largely
by what happens to real wage rates--it stops expanding, and the /Y
ratio will then be at that level around which it moves in response
to the behavior of the explanatory factors discussed above.
Such a theory places considerable weight on the evolution of a
capitalist class. Professor Lewis implies that given the opportunities
for profitable investment such a class will emerge to exploit them,
although at the same time he recognizes that social and political
institutions of all kinds can help or hinder the development of such
a class, Much of the literature on the problems of underdeveloped
countries emphasizes the lack of entrepreneurs and the problems created
thereby, but little attention has been given to formalizing the conditions
necessary for the creation and perpetuation of a continuing supply of
entrepreneurial talent. It is possible of course to accept the general
hypothesis of Professor Lewis and not ignore other social characteristics
that may influence the general level of saving. It would be useful
indeed if we could simply incorporate into our model the established
relationships between saving and religion, saving and family life,
saving and the governmental system, but in this area the literature is
unrevealing, and truistic generalities are all that are available.
To this point we have sought to examine the sources of saving
and the behavior of S/Y through time, and have ignored the more commonly
discussed question as to whether or not savings impose a barrier to
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growth or encourage it, The general discussion of this question will
be taken up in the section on demand, bowever, one remark does seem
worth makitg- here as it flows out of our discussion to this point.
Most econorw.. ts seem agreed that in a short-run problem, private and
pkuiblic inves tment provide the chief source of impetus in moving the
system vhile consumption is essentially passive, In the context of a
ong-rAun atalysis these roles may be reversed, Not in the sense that
avinrg reteuies resourcesi, which in turn reduce the interest rates and
1o increaseu investment; but rather in the sense that pressures on
consumption are such that the consumption function is constantly
moving upv Ad, and it is investment that responds to this shift in
consumption with the ceiling on Investment being imposed by the rate
of saving, We may say the same thing iln other words: There are
forces in a growing society--urbanizAtion, new products, etc.,- that
result in o iecular trend upward in the consumption function This
moveament cri*ates new and increasing profit opportunities and so en-
CrAgeVsflr Ce. 1tal accumuletion The investment prcocess then in effect
ereatos it. own saving.
This gi-neral position finds much to support it in the writings
of Ku.ets, Duesenberry, Goodwin, and others and additional elaboration
may coovenlently be postponed until later.
C. The Capital-Output Ratio
We turn now :o the set of problems involved in explaining the
time path of the productivity of capital, i.e,, the time path of the
k's in our mode s . We have already considered one aspect of this
general problen in the discussion of population, There we argued
that althougt population growth entered the per capita income growth
equation ne,;atively, changes in k are not independent of changes in
r and treore the rat oge W y d
because of the failure of population to grow at a sufficiently rapid
rate. That discussion was carried an in the context of the assumption
<f no technological change, and also no attention was given to the
problem of how the system shifted to more capital intensive processes.
In this section we consider these two issues as well as other factors
that may affect the behavior of k over time.
!.rst consider the process by which an economy becomes more capital
:.nteiSive without innovations, Since we have assumed a positive
y', capital is increasing relative to labor and so also an increase
in the capital-output ratio. To effect this shift in the productive
process used requires one of two possible events5 The composition
85By a change in process we mean the switching to known techniques
of production using merely a different combination of inputs from
that currently in use. Since few firms know their production surface
in any detail, the distinction between this kind of a change in
technique and a change in technology (where it is assumed that the
production surface itself changes) is of doubtful practical importance.
It is however useful theoretically.
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of output must change in such a way that a larger proportion of
output is devoted to products requiring relatively more capital per
unit of output and per unit of labor. The other event would be the
use of relatively more capital in the input mix. The composition
of output will change as income rises and this change will affect the
capital output ratio, but, as we shall see in a moment, there is no
reason to expect changes in composition to occur merely because the
relative supply of inputs has changed. This then puts the burden of
adaptation on changes in the cost of capital relative to the cost
of labor so the producers will seek to use more capital in the input
mix.
In earlier less complicated days such an adaptation process
posed no problem at all. The rate of interest declined as capital
accumulated reducing the price of time, and so encouraging the use of
more capitalistic techniques. Now few economists would place such
faith in the rate of interest in performing this task in the more
advanced countries of the world. The rate of interest is very low
and changes very little, and possibly not at all in response to
changes in the supply of capital. The empirical evidence also supports
the position that the rate of interest is ineffective in this respect.
Other costs of capital are very difficult to change relative to labor
costs because labor costs are of such importance in these other
costs. Thus in a highly developed economy there is no reason to
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expect labor costs in capital goods industries to behave otherwise
than as labor costs throughout the economy. A change in wage rates
then tends to affect capital costs to about the same extent that
it affects labor costs, and therefore affords no incentive to alter
the inaput mix. It would appear then that modern theory relies heavily
upon technological innovations to supply the mechanism by which the
system becomes more mechanized.
The situation may be quite different in the less developed
countries. In such societies the rates of interest are generally
very igh compared to (say) the United States and the United Kingdom
and therefore may be of considerable importance--even in the short
run-i-a determining the technique used in the productive process,
and a declining rate of interest may stimulate the use of relatively
more capital as it becomes available. Similarly we may argue that
as an economy develops from a rather primitive state to an advanced
state the cost of production of capital equipment may be expected
to decline relatively to other costs. The reason for this is to be
found in the increAsed availability of skilled labor and entrepreneurial
talent--essential for the construction of capital equipment--compared
with other types of labor.. For these reasons we may conclude that
in underdeveloped, but developing, economies changes in the relative
prices of inputs do constitute an effective means of producing changes
in the input mix.
86This point is made by several writers, see for example Mrs4
Robinson's paper referred to in note 13.
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However, even :it the adjustment proces to the rising I( L ratio
is iade smoothly, the rate of growth of itncoe (total and per ca±)
must at some point dec.line. This follows froma the fact that as capital
becomew more and rore plentiful relative to labor, the substitutability
between capital and labor declines, and the increment of output
attributable to inerenents of vapital-beyond that matched by an
equal intcrement of labor-must fall- A th i o curs k, will of
course rise, and this results in the rate of growth of income declining.
This means that even though a rate of growth of capital greater
than the rate of growth of population is necesary forprata
income to be rising. this situation itself leads to conditions that
result in that rate of growth falling. Furthermore sinc-e the profit
rate equals the share of income going to capitl over the capital-
output ratio ( qk),88 as k rises the rate of return on capital
will fall unless there is a enange in the distribution of income
between capital and labor. Therefore, innovations vst. be introduced
into our model for three reason*. First, they are necessary to
effect the shift, in the productive provcss iu order to use the
Increasing relative amounts of capital, Sevond, they are necessary
87
This argument Is discussed in very forml terms in H, D.
Dickinson, "A Note on Dynamte Economics, " Review of Economic Studies,
Vol XXII (3), (1954-1955), pp, 169-179
88
Let Q be the total return to capital and K the capital stock,
Then Q/K is the profit rate, and dividing numerator and denominator
by Y we obviously get q/k
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to maintain y' positive. And third a particular pattern of innovations
is necessary to keep the rate of return on capital at values acceptable
to investors. We consider now the problem of innovations,
An innovation is usually defined as a change in the relationship
between inputs and output, i.e., in the production function. Innova-
tions therefore have three effects. First they evidently effect
the rate of output with given inputs We may therefore define the
rate of innovations -n- as the percentage rate of increase in output
that would occur if inputs remain constant, Innovations also affect
the coefficients in the production function, and thirdly by virtue
of the effect on the input coefficients they also produce changes
in the distribution of the total product and the profit rate.
We are concerned at this point with the effect of changes in
technical knowledge on the behavior of y' and k, and we will con-
sider in the section on aggregative demand the effect on the profit
rate. The usual approach to this problem is to set up a scheme of
classifying innovations, and then to trace out the consequences of
the various types of innovations falling within the several categories. 90
8 9The proportion of the total product going to capital, q, is
and that going to labor is ' 0/L / These are
commonly referred to as the elasticity of productivity with respect
to capital and labor respectively.
90Such classification schemes probably began with Hicks in his
The Theory of Wages, (London: MacMillan and Co. 1932). Mrs Robinson,
R . F. Harrod, William Fellner, Yule Brozen and others have made
extensive examinations of the implications of various kinds of innovations,.
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It is necessary to content ourselves here with the most frequently
used system of classification, that of capital saving, capital using,
and neutral.
The discussion is facilitated by making use of the following
diagram adopted from Mrs. Robinson,91 and to simplify further we
assume that the rate of growth of population is zero.92 With no
change in technical knowledge the behavior of output will be as
indicated by curve 1. The clope o. this curve is the elasticity
of productivity and the share of output going to capital, q. If
capital accumulation is proceeding at the percentage rate r, then
at point F output is growing at a rate r q. Since q is almost
certainly less than unity, r q is less than r and capital is growing
more rapidly than output which of course contributes to a rising
capital output ratio.
91
In the sc rce cited in note 13. See also Henry J. Bruton,
"Innovations and Equilibrium Growth," Economic Journal Vol.
92This asumption is eliminated later.
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The effect of introducing a constant rate of innovations, is
reflected by the entire curve moving up at the given ratc, n
Now the rate of growth of output is rq + n. Consider for the moment
a single innovation that changes the effective curve from that
marked 1 to that marked 2. If the curve moves up isoelastically
at all points, then the innovation may be referred to as neutral
since the only effect on the production function is one of scale
What happens to k in this instance depends upon the value of n.
In order for k to remain constant and so contribute to a stable
rate of growth, it is necessary for the innovation effect to cancel
the effect of q being less than unity. Therefore if n = r - rq,
i.e., if n//r : 1 - q then output and capital stock will be growing
at the same percentage rate and evidently the capital-output ratio
will remain constant. If rW/r>1 - q k will have declined, and the
rate of growth of output tend to rise. And if n/r ( 1 - q then
evidently k will rise and the rate of growth of output tend to fall.
If curve 1 moves up so that at every point on curve 2 q is
larger than the corresponding point on curve 1, the innovation may
appropriately be called capital using. In this event the innovation
effect on q must be included to determine the net effect on output,
so now the rate of growth is rq + rdq + n. If k is to remain constant
then the equality '= l-q-dq must obtain. Evidently if innovations
are on balance capital using, the rate of innovations may be less
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and k remain constant than if innovations are neutral.
If curve 1 moves up in such a way that every point on curve
2 has a smaller elasticity, the innovation may be called capital
saving. Now the rate of growth of capacity is r-rde + n. and to
keep a constant k it is necessary that l-q + dq, In this case
n must be larger than if innovations were on balance neutral, and
a fortiori than if they were capital using.
It seems reasonable to say that q can approach neither zero nor
unity indefinitely, but must remain in a range well above zero and
well below unity. If this is an acceptable proposition then It
would appear that bnly if innovations were on balance neutral would
the system not run into interval difficulties due to q getting too
near *ero or unity. But there is a further difficulty which we
could ignore to this point because we were concentrating attention
on only two curves 1 and 2 and only a slight movement along the
P
capital axis. But if we consider a long period of time, then there
will be a substantial movement to the right along the capital axis
and if this occurs it seems evident that q must decline due to the
rising capital-labor ratio. The argument that q must at some point
decline is essentially the same kind of argument that leads us to
the opinion that the marginal product curve of any input is negatively
sloped from left to right'.
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Now if q is declining as the capital stock increases, the
rate of innovations must be rising in order to keep k constant.
The necessary rate of increase in n depends upon the rate of fall
of q and upon whether innovations are neutral, capital using, or
capital saving, but in all cases it must rise or the rate of growth
of capacity will tend to decline. Although we know littIe about the
innovative process, there seems no evidence that would suggest that
n has in the past or will in the future tend to rise consistently
over long periods of time in any country of the world. If we rule
out a rising n as being improbable to the point of being impossible,
then it follows that innovations must on balance be capital using
if k -is to be kept from rising and the system remain internally
consistent. This is to say that innovations must be such that they
counteract the effect of the falling q that accompanies the rising
capital -labor ratio. The net effect on q of the innovation and the
change in the capital-labor ratio will be to leave it approximately
constant, and therefore the result is comparable to that when innovations
are neutral. If afr w l-q then the system will go smoothly on at
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a constant rate of growth (insofar as the effect of k is cncerned)
This brief statement of the necessary behavior of innovations
indicates their crucial role in the growth process. They are crucial
93This is further elaborated in the Fellner source cited in
note 4.
with respect to the maintenance of the growth of income and to the
mvaintenance of the internal consistency of relatively free economies.
It is therefore especially regretful that the inventive and innovative
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processes are so little understood by economists. Some further
remarks as to a "theory of innovations" will occur in the following
section, Let us now assume that the innovation requirement is met,
and consider other factors that may affect k or more appropriately
the matrix of k's.
Two kinds of factors seem of particular relevance: the type
and extent of cooperating inputs and the composition of output,
With respect to cooperating factors, we have already considered
the role of labor and nothing more need be added here. The argument
with respect to natural resources is simple. If there are rich and
abundant resources, then evidently this will tend to make the product-
ivity of capital high and facilitate the maintenance of the desired
rate of growth. As resources become depleted then we would expect
more capital to be required to create the same rate of outputN
therefore raising the k's. In this event natural resources would
have an effect comparable to a declining VL ratio, and could be
treated in the same way that we treated the role of population.
9 4The point suggests a problem of importance to those under-
developed countries lacking internally generated innovations.
Technology borrowed from abroad where the need is for capital using
innovations may be completely unsuited for countries which are
plagued by capital shortages.
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The difficulty with this approach is that "natural resources"
are not a datum, but depend upon the state of technology. Objects
of no economic value may become valuable because of a new invention,
and similarly objects of great economic value at one point may be
worthless at another time because of a change in technical knowledge, 95
In a system where innovtions are more or less regular events it is
not possible to predict what happens to inputs of natural resources
without a prior consideration as to the behavior of innovations.
Presumably it would be possible to discuss natural resources, the
capital-output ratio, and technology in somewhat the same terms that
we discussed the changing I/L ratio and technology above. This
might be revealing if we knew more about the inventive and innovational
process in relation to natural resources, but as of now it would
be mere formalism revealing few if any useful implications.
The key point however is worth keeping in 'mind. In any analysis
of the growth process natural resources are augmentable, and must be
so considered. 9 6
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This point is discussed in a helpful way in the first four
chapters of the revised edition of Professor A. P. Usher's Histor
of Mechanical Inventions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).,
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A point similar to that made in note 94 is once more applicable,
this time with respect to natural resources rather than capital.
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Another aspect of the cooperating input effect on the matrix of
k's is concerned with the fact that "capital' is not a homogenous
factor, but rather is made up of many diverse types of machines,
equipment, plants, and buildings. This is indeed one of the basic
reasons for employing a multi-sector model in an analysis of growth.
The result is that the productivity of new capital depends not only
upon non-capital cooperating inputs, but upo existing capital as
well. Any new enterprise must use the services of public utilifies,
highways, raw material suppliers, etc,, and the extent to which such
services exist and are supplied cheaply and regularly determine in
a large measure the productivity of newly created capital. It seems
easy enough to indicate the general proposition involved here, but it
is very difficult to bring it down from a high level of abstraction
to the level of practical. application, The importance and nature of
external economies and increasing returns to capital are further
areas of the growth process that though of great relevance are difficult
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to pin down with confidence,
9 7 Such problems suggesi the appropriateness of linear programming,
See for example Hollis B. Chenery, "The R#'ole of Industrialization in
Development Programs," American Economic Review, Vol. XLV (May 1955),
pp,, 40-57 and Howard S. Ellis, "Conditions and Rates of Economic
Growth," Journal of farm Economics Vol XTJOIII, (Dec. 1955, Proceedings
Number), pp, 807-820,
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Perhaps one point may be made. In the early stages of capital
accumulation, the absence of existing capital overhead is likely to
be a major barrier to the realization of a satisfactory growth rate.
However, it seems equally clear that there is an early limit on this
interdependence effect on the growth rate. It is unlikely that in
the United States (for example) there are further effects on the
k's to be derived by economies growing out of the interdependence
of capital equipment with other capital equipment.
We may summarize this position by saying that for a system
developing from a state of little or no capital to one where capital
is used extensively in the productive process, the interdependence
effect of capital on the k's will contribute to an increasing rate
of growth as capital becomes more and more plentiful up to a certain
point and then the contribution becomes negligible. At this point
it seems safe to apply the variable proportions argument to capital
as a single factor of production.
Consider now the effects of the composition of output on the
nation 'a capital requirements. It seems clear that the capital-
output ratio is higher in agriculture than in manufacturing, if the
former activity is carried on with the most modern capitalistic
techniques. However, in those countries where agriculture is the
dominant industry, it is likely that the capital-output ratio Will
be greater in manufacturing because agriculture is carried on in
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such a primitive fashion Also in a developing economy it is un-
likely that agriculture will become capital intensive to any extent
before it is necessary to devote resources to manufacturing enter-
prises. If this is correct it means that as er ita income
rises to the point where the composition of output must change to
include an increasing proportion of nonagriculture products, the
k's will tend to rise contributing to a slowing down of the over-
all rate of growth.
When the economy reaches the point where it can afford public
utilities, harbor facilities, and educational plants the direct
effect of these expenditures is sure to raise the capital-output
ratios. It seems equally acceptable however to argue that it is
such capital equipment as this that contributes to external economies
and therefore they may, for the system as a whole, facilitate growth
expecially in some long-run sense. Brief reference has been Tmade to
the development of so-called service industries as ge capita income
continues to rise. Prevailing opinion seems to imply that these
industries are less capital using than so-called secondary activity,
and this--plus the possibility of capital-saving innovations--has
of course been a bulwark in the argument of several writers who are
concerned about secular stagnation. If there is no demand problem-
and at the moment we are assuming this--then this characteristic of
'tertiary industries' will of course tend to raise the rate of growth
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of the system, The reader is reminded hotwever of the difficulties
and ambiguities associated With te *oncept of service industries
and the cerollary problem of whether there is a sequence through
Which an econromy passes that may be appropriately classified as
primary, seccndary, and tertiary,
With respect to the effect of te composition of output on the
k's perhaps the most important factor involved after the system be-
comes fairly advanced is the extent to which construction activity
dominates total investment outlays Construction in all forms re-
quires great amounats of capita' per uit o output, and therefore
where this activity is carried on in a large scale the rate of growth
of capacity will tend to be less chat it would be if resoArces 'ere
devoted to (say) more textile machrtery Housing needs are related
primarily to population growth and the aternal movement of the popu-
lation especially that of farmerb to urban areas., We therefore expect
construction to be more iportant in a ss .here population is
joI rg rapidly than i a syste there a A grving flowly and to
be of greater consequence where the ecoaomy is changirg from a largely
rural economy to largely urbaa tha!n there the, urbanization process
has worked itself out,, For reasons already referred to we may therefore
expect construction to be especially tmportant in the early stages
of growth and continue to be so during the process of urbanization-
After this the housing component of total construction may be said
to depend upon the shocks to the system that are reflected in changes in
the rate of growth of population
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It also seems likely that the initial building of factories,
public utilities, schools, and hospitals require more capita per
unit of output than do extensions of these facilities after they
have become integrated into the system. This leads to the view that
construction requirements and capital requirements for construetion
are greatest when the economy is in the early stages of becoming
industrialized, or perhaps more accurately when it is becoming
relatively less agricultural.
Where does this leave us with respect to the time path of the
matrix of k 's. Even if we make specific assumptions about the behavior
of innovations, is it possible to make any assertion as to the
behavior of the k's of the system? The right answer would involve
knowing the weights that should be attached to the factors discussed
above and how these weights change through time. Unhappily we do
not know these things. Empirical material on several countries
suggest that for a period 1880-1950 the ratio of the total stock
of capital to total output seem to remain about constant to 1920
or 1930 and then to tend to decline after that date. It is a simple
matter to explain this behavior in terms of our discussion above,
but caution is called for in doing so. Data on capital stocks are
notoriously unreliable, and conclusions derived therefrom are equally
suspect. Nevertheless it seems to be a defensible position to take
to assume that capital requirements per unit of output rise as the
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economy becomes relatively less agricultural and then to level off
and possibly decline after employment in agricultural activity falls
to 15-30 per cent. At this point further changes in the k's become
dependent upon the shocks to the system reflected in population growth
and technology.
IV. The Aggregative Demand Problem
To this point we have assumed the system to grow at the rate
permitted by the growth of capacity, and have ignored the problem of
demand. Analysis of the behavior of aggregative demand has of
course been discussed in countless books and articles over the
last twenty years, but despite this there does not seem to have
emerged a common set of ideas that we may plug into our model.
Since this problem has been so much discussed in the literature, 9 8
it appears most useful to concentrate on those aspects of the problem
that seem to be of most relevance in a long-run context. We shall
see that for the most part these aspects can all be included under
one or the other of the general headings- population growth, invention
and innovation, and entrepreneurship.
The dominant opinion is clearly that investment demand is the
crucial factor and provides the mainspring to growth, while con-
sumption is passive and simply responds to income changes. Keynes
assumed investment autonomous and put entire weight on it to move
the system. In a recent survey article on growth theory, Professor Domar
9 8 Moses Abramovitz essay on growth economics in A Survey of
Contemorary Economics Vol. II, is ccncerned very largely with this
problem.
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also assumed investment autonomous.99 In light of this it is ap-
propriate to begin our discussion assuming the key problem to be
investment, although later this assumption itself will be challenged.
We have written the investment equation for a sector as
I -..b (X -X ), where b it is recalled, is a behavioristicit- i jt jt-1 1
and technological parameter rather than merely technological. The
problem then may be defined in terms of the time path of b', and
this time pathi we suggest is dependent to a very large extent upon
the behavior of inventions and innovations and entrepreneurship
through time.
We introduce as our primary behavioristic assumption the notion
that investors seek to earn a rate of return on their outlay equal
to that that they in a given social environment feel is suitable.
We may refer to this as the equilibrium profit rate, E , and write
the actual profit rate as E . Investment decisions then hinge on
the relation between E and E ; if R E this is a deterrant to
e a e a
further investment and if Ea > e evidently increased investment
is encouraged. Since I vrill not become capital until period t+1,
the b reflects the investorns attitudes with respect to the rate o
return on the newly created capital. It can easily be seen that tho
pure accelerator theory o investnent will fit in this argument as
a special case under specific assumptions as to expectations. If
99Evsey D. Domar, "Economic Growth: An Econorctric Approach,"
American Economic Review, Vol. XLII (May 1952) pp. 479-495.
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the entrepreneur expects the rate of growth in demand for his product
in the succeeding periods to be equal to that he has just experienced
and that his share of return will remain unchanged, he will invest
in such a way that the accelerator model holds. But also the theory
emphasizes what is surely necessary to emphasize, namely the fact
that investors think in terms of expected rate of return rather
than in terms of achieving a specific capital-output ratio.
The basic question then at this point in explaining the behavior
of investment is to explain the behavior of E and E ,e a
Once more it is appropriate to begin with our remarks on population.
Much depends upon the population situation when the economy begins
its developmental process. As we noted in the section on population
few--if any--presently advancea countries began their grovth with
an overwhelming population problem, and consequently were never faced
with the problem that now confronts most of Asia and parts of Africa
and Eastern Europe. We have shown reason to expect the rate of
growth of population to rise rapidly in the early stages of development
and then to taper off. If this growth proceeds from a low base then
the scale added to the economy by the new population may react
favorably on investment decisions in several ways. The increasing
labor supply will tend to supply capital with cooperating inputs,
and this in turn may result in the capital-output ratio declining
or at least not rising which in turn acts favorably on the profit
rate. The increased size of the economy may also permit the use of
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more efficient techniques associated with large-scale output, and
this too may encourage more investment because of its effect on the
profit rate. We have already spoken of the effect of population
growth on the composition of demand in our analysis of the behavior
of the capital output ratios, From that discussion it follows that
the demand generated by rapid population growth--housing, schools,
health facilities, etc,--are likely to be capital intensive, and
absorb large amounts of savings,, Then as income continues to rise
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population growth falls, and the demand due to it declines.
Also even if consumption continues to grow at the same rate, it is
likely to be channelled into areas that require less capitalistic
productive techniques, and consequently the demand for capital goods
will tend to decline.
A high rate of population growth proceeding from an optimum
or less than optimum base may also effect investment demand in another way.
It has been argued that with a high rate of population growth mistakes
are less likely to be permanently damaging. Temporary oversupply of
a particular kind is quickly eliminated and exercises little or no
negative effects on investment plans. Similarly it has been argued
00Several writers have worked out what is in effect an ac-
celerator theory of investment based on population changes. See for
example H. A. Adler, "Absolute or Relative Rate of Decline in Population
Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LIX (August 1945)
pp. 625-634 and Clarence L. Barber, "Population Growth and Demand
for Capital," American Economic Review, Vol. XLIII (March 1953) pp. 133-139.
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that the demand accompanying a rising population, being concentrated
on essentials and staples of living, is more dependable than demand
accompanying merely a rise in per capita income because that demand
tends to be concentrated on luxury items, and presumably is therefore
less stable. The result is held to be that entrepreneurs are usually
more optimistic in a society with a growing population, and so maintain
a higher rate of investment than they would in the same circumstances
if population were tat or growlin; at a sower rate,
A final point deserving mention concerns the effect of popu-
lation behavior on labor mobility and adaptability, A young and
growing population is perhaps the most effective way to assure
maximum mobility of labor geographically and occupationally. Middle-
aged workers are reluctant to move across town, not to mention across
country, and frequently are unable to learn new skills, while there
is fairly convincing evidence that younger people are more adaptable
and flexible in almost all respects,. The effect of this will be to
tend to eliminate labor bottlenecks and to provide the entrepreneur
with a more reliable and adequate labor supply at lower wage rates.
And, as we shall see later, any development that contributes to
fluidity and flexibility in the economy system also contributes to
making the task of carrying out investment plans easier and less
risky. Indeed there is possibly little exaggeration in saying that
the negative effects on total demand of a falling rate of growth of
population are much more severe--and much less tractable--because of
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the effect of such a decline in the eas4e and speed vi th which the
labor force adapts itself to changing cicumstances than because of
the effect of the absolute amouat of demand created by population
growth itself. This is to say that if a stationary population could
remain as flexible and adjustable as a growing population, this fact
itself would terd to offset the changes (in demand) due to the behavior
of absolute numbers.
For the cotvatry that begins its growth with a population that
is well above the optimum the preceding analysis requires some modi-
fication. The advantages arising out of increased scale that we
suggested earlier might accompany population growth will in this
situation depend upon the. growth of per capita income. Population
growth when proceeding from a les than optimum base creates an
enlarged market, but when proceaeiing from a larger than optimum
base it prevents that enlarged Mrket-and the advantages accruing
therefrom--from materializing,, In this kind of circumstance there
is no oversaving problem in the usual tense of this term, and the
key task is to limit population in order that per capita income
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may rise,
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This is a fairly commor argumen 't applied to underdeveloped
countries. It was first given theoretical elegance in Ragnar Nurkse,
Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1953).
ill
When the rate of growth of population begins to fall--for
reasons discussed in Section III--the effect on aggregative demand
may possibly be of significance. However, it seems clear that for
most of the countries now in the category of overpopulated, p capita
income will long remain so low that the over-saving problem may be
safely ignored.
Whether or not the growth process begins from a population
base of optimum or more than optimum size, the population effect
on aggregative demand tends to act contrariwise to the needs of the
system. It seems clear enough that in the early stages of growth-
as the industrialization process gets under way--the demand problem,
irrespective of the population effect, is less severe than in later
stages. But as we have pointed out, the contribution of population
growth to demand is greatest in the early periods and then tapers
off. Demand generated by population beh:avior is therefore greatest
when it is needed the least, and the least when it is needed the
most. It should of course always be remembered that shocks to the
population behavior equation may change (temporarily) this conclusion. 1 0 2
It may be observed also that even if a declining rate of growth
of population can be ascertained as the chief factor responsible for
a failure of demand to grow at a rate approaching the limits of
102Population growth effects on other aspects of the system
may of course be favorable; e.g., the labor supply may behave in
a way to encourage growth.
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capacity, it does not follow that the correct policy action involves
an attempt to raise the rate of growth of population. This may be
the case in some rare instances, but for most countries at the present
time--and certainly for the world as a whole--it is very likely that
a rapid rate of population growth is objectionable for many rather
obvious reasons. And since a mere deficiency of total demand can
easily be eliminated 1y government action, it is doubtful if it is
necessary to resor . to rapid population groiwth as a means of creating
the appropriate amount of demand.103
We have already discussed the role of innovations on the growth
of the capacity of the system, and now we may use the same set of
ideas to examine the effect of innovations on the profit rate and
hence on investment demand,
Complications arise because we assume that the entrepreneur
seeks not to maintain a given capital--output ratio, but rather he
seeks to maintain a given profit rate, E e Since the profit rate
is equal to q/k (where q is the share of output going to capital),
a change in the value of q must be exactly matched by a corresponding
change in k in order to maintain equilibrium. It is however a
simple matter to introduce the new equilibrium requirement into the
discussion of innovations of the previous section,104
103 This is meant to be an interpretation of prevailing opinion,
not my own value judgment.
104The discussion that follows is based on Feliner op. cit., and
Bruton op. cit. Professor Fellner emphuasizes that inovations must not be
so labor-saving that they impose an unobt2ainable adjus.ent problem
on the system so that inc.easing unemployment results
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Let q a be the percentage rate of change of q due to the innovation.
If the innovation is neutral then q' is zero and there is no change
in our previous findings. If the innovation is capital using then
q' is positive, and if equilibrium is to prevail it is necessary for
k to rise in the same proportion. Since income will grow at a rate
equal to rq + rdq + n, the equality of E and E- requires that
e a
qt = r - (rq * rdq 4 a)
that is a 1 - q - dq,
r
But since q' is positive, k must rise and this in turn will contribute
to a reduction in equilibrium rate of growth of capacity.105 Evi-
dently under these assumptions n, the rate of innovations, may be
less than when equilibrium required a constant k.
It can easily be seen that if the innovations are capital seving,
the equilibrium condition is
n= - q+dq
r
and here evidently as k will be falling, the equilibrium rate of
growth of the capacity of the system will be rising. To achieve this
n must be greater than in the case where equilibrium required a constant k.
There are two points of interest here. On the one hand, it
becomes evident that the requirements of entrepreneurs with respect
105it is evident of course that the larger is k, the lower is
the percentage rate of growth of income. The increase in k is
produced simply by stepping up the rate of capital accumulation
relative to the increases in labor. Incidentally, it is easy to
devise a model of a cycle with this apparatus.
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to the rate of return on capital has a major effect on the rate of
growth of the system. This effect works itself out by virtue of
r responding to changes in E ; if Ea > E this will encourage further
capital accumulation, and as w.e have seen Iurther capital accurulation
will tend to raise k relative to q and so depress E And evidnl
a
if R < E , entrepreneurs will seek to reduce the amount of capital
a e
that they have then r will becone:. negative, On the other hand. there
is the question of whther inovations will 1e forthacoming at the
rate and the dirtion quired to keep Ea (or more apsrpr atciy
a
expected E a) high enough that invetors will be willing to con.inue
to accimulate capitaL, In the preoi a setion vre sipy assumed
that innovations behaved appropriately, butitse:s clear tha
the role of innovations in growth is so crucial that somce oot
must be made to include their behavior within the boundaries of the
explanatory framework,
Contemporary economics does not offer a 'theory of innovations
in the sense of a systematic theory accounting for the ehaviro
all aspects of innovations thrugh time, This is'tu f se
authors whose theory rels avily upon the behavi of ns
106Thus Sc-h t s cOZnce:rned with tracinl- ou the imp..o tIon
innaovatAions, not; with exlaining ter origins .Caec rs
Theory of Economic Progress (Chae Hill: Uilversity of >i th aoina
Press, 1944), believ,- es tha:t the 1-- y t"o une-anigaWEscso
economic reali": deers pnunesadigtchooy but lie le
no effort to provd nan caJ aparatus that contribt. s t that
uiderstanding. 'The savoral p yYale Brozen -u this subjoot
are however useful and enligtenin ca.
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and what follows should be considered largely as conjectures that
seem to pervade the literature.
It is necessary to keep separate two distinct phenomena,
invention and innovation. If we think of an invention as the creation
of a new technique or new product and an innovation as the putting
it into effect, then evidently inventions are a necessary prerequisite
to innovations. The distinction is further called for since the
fact.r cotrbItng to t 'c'mat r a rapid ate of iv'nTioin
are not always thOse that on:trivtet to a rapid rate of innovation.
We consider first the process of invenn 107
Historical evidence a",ong r-urrently advanced countries suggests
that as an economy becomes more and more developed it allocates an
increasing quantity of resources to the search for improved techniques
and improved products . Entrepreneurs, managers , and engineers are
learning all the time, and are continuously putting into effect the
results of their newly acquired knowledge i Mary firms waintain
research and development departments whose very purpose is to provide
a constant stream of inventions eligible to be turned into innovations
by the policy uakers. Under these circumstances the inventive (and
innovational) process is as much a part of the economic process as
is adjustment to a given technology, and therofore is subject to the
1 0 7The problems here discussed would fall into the area included
in W. W, Rostow's first, second, and fourth propensities,
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maximization scheme that governs the firm's policy decisions. Indeed
in many instances expenditures on research are treated as an outlay
which results in revenue just as any other outlay made by the firms
is assumed to do.108
The result seems to be that economic growth is accompanied by
a regularization of inventions or, perhaps more accurately, an attempt
at regularization. It suggests also that the patterns of inventions
become less subject to chance and luck as they become more and more
a strategic part of the firm's effort to maintain its profit rate.
If this kind of argument is accepted it appears that the firrs'
activities are such as to contribute to a behaviorial pattern of
inventions that is consistent with the requirements as to direction
laid down previously, That requiroment, it will be recalled, mas
that inventions must in the long run bo capital using, i.e., they
must raise q. Now a rise in q will tend to raise the profit rate,
and if inventions are a part of the routine of business onterpr:Ise
we expect inventive efforts to tend to produce a rising q.
108Further discussion of this point may be found in Gordon F.
Bloom, "Wage Pressure and Technological Discovery," American Economic
Review, Vol. XLI (Sept. 1951) pp. 603-617; W. Rupert Maclaurin,
"Technical Progress in Some American Industries," American Econc:7io
Review, Vol. XLIV, (May 1954), pp. 178-189; Carolyn Shaw Solo,
I'Innovation in the Capitalistic Process,"Q of Econo:ies,
Vol. LXV (August 1951), pp. 417-428; and United States National
Resources Committee, Technological Trends and National Policy,
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1937) passin.
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As for the rate of inventions, little can be said with
confidence even in purely formal terms. It seems generally agreed
now that inventions do not constitute a major and sharp break with the
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past, but rather evolve out of an existing situation. It would
appear not unreasonable to expect that purposeful and directed re-
search programs would tend to speed up this evolutionary process.
At the same time however, there is evidence that the devoting of
resources to inventive activity is itself haphazard in relation to
the requirements outlined above, and also that the effect varies
widely in relation to "inputs." Indeed it seems impossible by defi-
nition to specify an exact relation between inputs and outputs where
the latter is "knowledge." Therefore, even if it were acknowledged
that business enterprises or governments did direct a given percentage
of their resources to "inventive activity," there is no assurance
that the results will be equally constant. Even though more and
more firms consider technology as a variable and to some extent subject
to control, the application of the customary rules of production
theory do not seem applicable. And until the inventive process is
understood more clearly it is doubtful that technical knowledge can
be made a control variable similar say to a government surplus or deficit.1 10
1 0 9Cf. H. G. Barrett, Innovation: The Basis of Cultural Change,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953); the essay by A. P. Usher in Moses
Abramovitz (editor), Capital Formation and Economic Growth, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1956); and S. C. Gilfillan, The Sociology of
Inventions (Chicago: Follett Publishing Co., 1935).
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Perhaps the most useful work that it is now possible to do is
in the area of case studies of the history of inventions and innovations
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With respect to innovations the situation is somewhat different,.
Since innovating consists of introducing a new process, it presumably
will be done when the policymaker thinks the potential effect on
his profit rate warrents the action. The act of innovating is there-
fore probably much more certain than the act of inventing. In the
case of inventing, the decision to devote resources to research is
filled with uncertainty as to the rewards obtainable from that investiment -
However, the effecting of an innovation is much less of a blind act,
and even more than is the case with respect to invention may be brought
within the limits of the prit maximization scheme of the individual firm.
In this way then the analysis of innovaeions i.s essentially an analysis
of market situations that provide incentives to the introduction of
technical change.
The most frequently discussed relationship is of course that
between innovations and monopoly. Even here in this widely discussed
area there seem to be few propositions that can safely be said to be
part of the current thinking of a modern economist. Unhappily
in given industries. See for example A. A. Bright Jr., The Electric
Lamp Industry:_ Technologcal Change and Development from 1800 to 1947,
(New York: The MacMillan Co. 1949) and W, R. Maclaurin, Invention and
Innovation in the Radio Industry, (New York: The MUacMillan Co. 1949),
111A recent survey of the literature on this subject is the
paper of P. Hennipman, "Mnopoly: Impediment or Stimulus to Economic
Progresa," in E. H. Chamberlin (edi4tor), Monopoly and Competition and
Their Regulation, (London: AMtitllan and Co. Ltd, 1954).
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like almost all of the other problems with which we are concerned,
much can (and has been) said on both sides.
On the negative side fears of excess capacity anc/or losses in
sunk capital seem to be most important. As a monopolist exercises
control over the market by virtue of his control over supply, he
seeks to maintain a market structure permitting the earning of a
satisfactory rate of return of his invested capital. In an oligopolistic
situation it is difficult to expand at the expense of competitors,
and the tendency is therefore to create a reluctance to experiment
with a new technique or new product. The monopolist by virtue of
his control over the market seeks to prevent innovations which will
result in existing capital being made obsolete,112 while in a competitive
situation the entrepreneur knows that he must innovate in order to
protect himself from competitors who will innovate. Therefore, an
economy dominated by large monopolistic enterprises tends to be
slower in introducing changes in technique than an economy--with an
equivalent flow of inventions--dominated by competitive firms.
Independently of the monopolistic aspects of large scale enter-
prises, frequent mention is made to the effect that large corporations
are necessarily run by a bureaucracy. And one of the characteristics
of a bureaucracy is conservatism, and a tendency to seek to achieve
112Further discussion of these points is contained in J. Steindl,
Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1952) and Evsey D. Domar's essay "Investment, Losses, and Monopolies"
in Income, Employment, and Public Policy, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948).
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security at the expense of progress with uncertainty. Management
decisions are therefore aimed at maintaining the status q and
trying to avoid risky undertaking, rather than yielding to the lure
of possible profits due to innovations. Under these circumstances
the very form of corporate enterprise militates against the intro-
113duction of new techniques and new ideas.
On the positive side the arguments are usually one of two kinds.
In the first place large-scale--and hence monopolistic--enterprises
are necessary to supply inventions. The assumption that the flow of
invention is the same in a competitive economy as in a monopolistic
economy is therefore an untenable assumption. In the second place,
it has been argued that monopoly profits are a necessary incentive
to innovate. The possibility of a temporary gain competed away is
not a sufficient inducement, rather it is necessary to allow the
prospects of a permanent gain in profit or market position before
firms will trouble themselves to introduce innovations.
Such a list of pros and cons leaves us nowhere. It seems clear
furthermore that growth or existence of monopolies and cartels have
had different effects in different countries. This means either
that the effects of monopoly on innovational activity depend on
other factors, or that other factors completely submerge the effects
of monopoly and bigneS. Perhaps the key point that can be made with
confidence is with respect to inventions rather than innovations.
Cf. amberg op. cit., pp. 129 ff
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If it could be shown that only in the research laboratorics of large-
scale firms could technical knowledge be advanced, then all arguments
against such firms must fall to the ground. As inventions are a
necessary prerequisite to innovations it does not matter how con-
ducive the market structure is to innovations, if there are no
available inventions no innovations will be possible. Over the
long-run surely the invention problem itself is of more concern, and
as we noted above, little formal analysis has been applied to the
process involved. 1
Perhaps one possible conclusion of considerable importance can
be reached. With respect to both in--entions and innovations it sems
clear that the rate is likely to be higher in new industries and
new firms than in old established ones. Several reasons may be
mentioned why this seems reasonable. NCw firms are much more interested
in finding a place in the market as opposed to maintaining the status
quo. Thus, the incentive to seek new inventions and to put thea
into effect iumediately may be greater in new enterprises than In
old. We may also epect that business leaders in new ::ndustr':es would
be more optimietic and more alert as to the advantagos of a ria 3
policy with respect to innovations and investzent. 1 1 5  Possilythe
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Although there may be doubt--as we have noted-with res
to the development of monopoly through time, there seems little
doubt that large-scale industry increases as an economy grows.
To the extent that the degree of monopoly does not increase as the
economy develops the problems--or advantages--accompanying that
increase would not be present.
115Nicholas Kaldor, "The Relation of ?coic Growth and Cyclical
Fluctuations," Economic Journal, Vol, LXIV (arch 1954), pp. 51-71 puts
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most important factor of all (mentioned in Section II) is that the
possibilities for technical progress in a single productive activity
are limited. The more improvements that are made in the technical
aspects of a given process the less scope there may be for further
improvement, and therefore we may expect the rate of technical progress
in old industries to taper off. We may also expect that the new
industry or the new activity faced with the problem of catching up
with the rest of the economy is likely to be more willing to incur
the risks accompanying innovations than are the leaders of enterprises
whose growth depends upon the growth of the economy ancVor competing
customers away from other firms.
we may argue then that new industries provide more possibilities
for inventions and also more incentives for innovations than old
industries. From this it follows that a key factor in the growth
process of an economy is the extent to which new products and new
firms are forthcoming. This suggests that the policy aims of a
society should include that of maintaining a market structure that
permits ease of entry of new firms with new blood and new ideas into
old industries, and that of simplifying the development and exploitation
of new products. More on this later.
a heavy emphasis on optimism among entrepreneurs as a factor ex-
plaining growth.
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One further remark, applicable to both inventions and innovations,
seems useful at this point and will lead us into our discussion of
entrepreneurial activities 11 seet clear that a fluid economic
and social atmosphere is a major inducement to the discovery and
exploitation of new techniques and new ideas, We have already
suggested that as a country changes from a rural, agriculture-dominated
co~~munity to an urbn, udn tal sul , acceptance of cLange a pars to
become less reluctant Awe e p the prooition that
economic growth is accompanied by a relative deemphasis of egriculture
and an increase in urbanization and the variety of activities associated
with urban livig and ma ufactirirg enterprises, we may expect the
community to become more open minded about technical change as growth
proceeds, For this reanc then we would expect the social atmosphere
within which the economy func zions to become increasingly encouraging
116
to the development aid opi t f new ideas of all sxos
We hve to this point act .d as if the whole investment decision
process was a completely objective problem independent of the person-
alities of those who performt o.r are responsible for performing the
entrepreneurial function Cle.arly this is not a very realistic
assumption, and we need to refcrtze---at least--that differences
1Several writers--e g,,, Ba~rrett and Gilfillan--also point to
the need for leisure time to permit concentration on methods of
solving current problems, This point is elaborated upon a little
in the following section-
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In tie rates ot groiwtt :oteen two couint.rie or in the same country
at two different time priods -nay be explained, in part, by reference
to the behavior of entreprenevrship, We need to know two things:
first, it is necessary to specify the roile of the entrepreneur in
the growth process, and secondly, it is necessary to examine the
behavior through time of the supply of entrepreneurial talent.
In using b, a behavioristic parameter, as our investment function
we have stated that investment is in no sense automatic and does not
respond passively to changes in income The initiating and pursuing
of investment projects evidently depends upon the availability of
persons willing and able to do this !iitiating and pursuing. As
an entrepreneur is defined as such a person, it is almost tautological
to say that the role of entrepreneurs is crucial to growth, An econ-
omy may lag not because there are no resources, no profit opportunities
but simply because there is to one around to provide the driving
force essential to exploit these latent advantages- The entrepreneur
then is simply the instrument by which investment plans are made
and put into effect, Since under rather general assumptions the
actions of entrepreneurs to some extent justify themselves,117 a
society blest with a large group of dynamic, optimistic leaders
may be able to grow rapidly despite lack of 'objective' profit
opportunities. This is to say that entrepreneurs not only exploit
1 1 7See footnote 33-
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profit opportunities generated Oy the system, but by their own
action they may create profit opportunities and therefore move the
system. Evidently then changes in the supply of entrepreneurial
talent as the economy grows is of interest in accounting for the
behavior of aggregative demand through time.
To a considerable extent the issues involved are tied up 1ith
'Socio-e4conomic values' and 'socio-economic structure, and, as the
values and structure that are most conduAcive to the development and
exploitation of entrepreneurial talent are the same as those that
contribute to the effective performance of other parts of the system,
we may postpone considerations in this sphere until the last section,
Here we limit our discussion to the propositions that seem to follow
from our preceding analysis,
Does a developing ystem genera, e changes that tend to increase
entrepreneurial talent? For e-veral reasons the answer seems to be yes.
Perhaps the most imortant single factor in this respect is
simply precedence, As a country ' income grows, evidence must
accumulate that private gain way be had by finding ad exploiting
new opportunities, As it becomes apparent to society that profit
may be made, then we may expect this evidence to serve as encouragement
to potential entrepreneurs to take the plunge. Entrepreneurial
emulation is surely as prevalent as consumption emulation, and of
course even more important in explaining investment activity. Also
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as entrepreneurial activity succeeds, barriers--of all kinds--to
be overcome in carrying on such activity may be reduced. M8 IS
suggests that as a consequence of the successful carrying out of
investment projects, inventions, and innovations entrepreneurial
activities become less deviant and more nearly orthodox. As is the
case with almost all kinds of behavior orthodoxy facilitates its
expression, and repetition makes for orthodoxy; it would therefore
seeA that successful entrepreneurship breeds on itself and once
a system begins to grow, that growth itself tends to create a situation
which is conducive to an increased supply of entrepreneurial services
We have mentioned in several places the fact that urbanization
is almost sure to accompany the early stages of growth. Evidence is
consistent with the hypothesis that traditionalism is less in cities
than in rural areas, and this in turn may facilitate independent
thought and action and so contribute to an atmosphere more acceptable
to new ideas and new techniques. The urbanization movement may also
break down family ties to the extent that individuals cannot rely
upon lifetime support from their family or relatives, and consequently
find it necessary to discover ways and means of earning a livelihood.
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Schumpeter produces the upward phase of his cycle by a bunching
of innovations; the bunching occurs because after a couple of in-
novations have been successfully launched, it is easier to carry
out others. The suggestion in the text is that something like this
occurs secularly as well. We may solve the problem of the source
of the first entrepreneur by saying that it is not a question answer-
able with the economise tools, W. A. Lewis says that he is imported.
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This dev*lopaent my orce people into now areas of work and indeed may
force the to create no* areas. It should also be etiphaSized that the
incentives work in favor of the entrepreneur in towns while probably
119not in rural areas, or certainly not as much o.
TWo further considerations are inditated by our previous analysis.
The improved banking and credit institutions may ease the capital
supply ob~feiji.' 'As we 'have noted sudh institutions may not increase
the saving-income ratio, but they do tend to assure -a more productive
use of savings that are available. And this greater ease in borrowing--
including lower interest rates--removes a hurdle of major proportions
from the path of potential entrepreneurs. In the very earliest
stages of growth unavailability of funds may constitute the chief
barrier to small, village industrialization efforts. To some extent
it is also true that increased knowledge and the ease with wich
information is transmitted reduces the uncertainty that is inheroent
in any new undertaking. To reduce the risk to the risk bearer will
presumably make him willing to bear more risk and will enable rmnore
persons to bear some risk.
Several writers--e.g., Schumpeter, Brozen, Lewis-4ave emphasized
the importance of new men' in maintaining entrepreneurial supply.
By new men is meant men who beeome entrepreneurs after having been
in somae other occupation. This would seem to require a pool in which
119 In a very significant way the attitudes and atmosphere in
urban areas--espedially neW urban areas--is similar to that on the frontier.
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potential entrepreneurs are in effect warmed up or trained, and out
of which they may easily move into the entrepreneurial groups. It
is not easy to define such a pool nor the conditions for its existence,
but one characteristic does seem essential: a strong middle class.
A strong middle class doea several things First it preventcs the
complete dominance of an economy by any kind of an elite; entrenched
power is virtually always interested In prolong.ing the status guo,
and historical evidence suggests that a large middle class is a most
effective antidote to domination by an elite,
At the same time that ruling groups rarely supply people whose
very job is to effect a change, so also peasants, sharecroppers,
or day laborers cannot be relied upon to supply such people with any
degree of regularity, We are left therefore to rely on the middle
class not only to prevent domination by an elite, but also to supply
the carrier of change. Members of such a group may be expected to
be acquainted with existing techniques and methods and with the
problems that seem to be most acute at a given moment . They may
also be expected to be aware of the possibilities and advantages of
growth--i e., to possess the idea of progress--and therefore to have
the incentive as wall as the know-hov necessary to be the instruments
of growth.
There are undoubtedly numerous and complex factors that are
necessary to produce a strong middle class, but some evidently evolve
along with economic growth. In particular it is appropriate to mention
129
the effects of increasingly W despre d education, the growth of
government services, and the develor: .- of a social awareness all
of which seem to work in the directim ot producing a middle class
with cohesion and yet with considerabLe flexibility, We have
argued also that all tend to accompanip.y economic growth.
This discussion presents an encouraging view of entrepreneurship
supply problems in a growing economy io ever, there is one consideration
that is less heartening, We have shown that tbe continued growth of
the system requires the frequent entry of new firms, and we have
also suggested that there is posibly a tendency for venture capital
to become increasingly difficult for new firms aid new men to come
by due to the behavior of personal and corporate saving habits,
When it is recalled that technological factors in advanced societies
are likely to require oven rev fim to be large firms, t-he shortage
of finance-not total savings-for poenial new ent repreneurs may
have a significant negative ffect entrepreneurial supply, It
is difficult to examine this possibuility empirically since there are
few records of entrepreneurs that did not come into being for lack of
funds. It should also be emphasized that the hypothesized behavior
of personal and corporate saving is indeed very questionable, and
that the existence of a well equipped banking and credit system
may itself prevent this possibility from becoming a reality.
Perhaps the generalization may b ventured that the obstacles
to effective entrepreneuirial activity are declining as the movement
away from agriculturaI d n e firmly established and on its way,
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In later stages increasingly complex technology that requires large
initial outlays4 plus posible difficut ies in securing financial
backing may then create new obstacles or at least prevent further
improvements in the entrepreneurs lot This leads to the notion
that the matrix of b1's--to the extent that it depends on entrepre-
neurial talent--may well be relatively weak in a stagnant, low income
country, but become increasingly strong as the economy grows, and
then tend to level off and possibly even to weaken again.
What can be said in conclusion about the behavior of investment
demand over a long period of historic time? We have written the
investment equation in terms of changes in output, but emphasized
that the functional relationship ws not purely technological--
as is implied by the accelerator--but also represented a behavioristic
parameter as well, We also introduced two effects on the function;
that produced by the profit rat(e and that produced by the supply of
entrepreneurial talent. The behavior of the profit rate in our
survey was found to depend primarily upon the behavior of population
growth and inventions and innovations, being positively related to
both.120 We decided against population growth as a continuing factor
contributing to the maintenance of the profit rate, and this then
left the full burden on teebuical change, The nearest thing to a
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A qualification is needed for the case when population growth
proceeds from a base much larger than optimum,
f-rm proposition about inventions and innovatios that we could find
Indicated that the maintenance of thei.r rate depended on the emergence
of new frme ad new industr.es Ad at this point we hooked onto
entrepreneurts The discussicn here gv ome reasonI to think that
obstacles to effective entrepreneuria1l activity increased somewhat-
at least did not decline indefinitely-as growth progressed, and this
would mean a negative effect on. the rate of creation of new industries
and new firms as well as on the ratc o expansion of old firms,
Does this mean that stagnation on the demand side is a definite
threat to an economy that' has experienced a long period of relatively
rapid growth of pj capita income? Surely no one knows 21 Shocks
to the system that have major (but possibly temporary) effects on
population growth and technology may for long periods be such as
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to negate stagnation tendencies that might be present.. In addition
we repeat-again and again-tat both4 the arguments and the empirical
evidence supporting our conclusiona are far from unas&ailable,.
Inventions and innovatioif are of coure especially crucial, and our
knowledge and understanding specia y inadequate
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The moat recent paper on the stagnation hypothesis is that of
B, Higgins, "Interactions of Cycles and Trends " Economics Journal, Vol. LXV
(December 1955), pp, 594-614 Mr, Higgins is perhaps the most convinced
of all writers that the United States economy is threatened by "increasing
underemployment,,"
1 2 2 Trygve Haavelmo, A Study in the Theory of Economic Evolution
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co, 1954) Part IV discusses the
stochastic approach to theorizing about long term processes and the
difficulties created thereby for long run prediction,
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It is worthwhile to examine very briefly the proposition that
the chief motivating force of growth JA not the entrepreneur with
his capital accumulation and innovations, but rather it is the consumer
with his consumption behavior, A bare reference to this was made
in the section on saving, and we are able to expand only slightly
here 123
Two arguments are immediately available, The Dueserberry-
Modigliani hypothesis that the floor under consumption outlays tends
to rise as income rises means that income tends to be kept from falling
back to the low level reached in previous cyclical troughs. Richard
Goodwin has also suggested a similar proposition for business firms.
In periods of rising income Mr . Goodwin suggests that all outlays
rise easily and some tend then to become fixed--e.,g,, interest,
stable dividends, managerial, maintenance, and sales staff, etc.,--
and are not easily reduced in the course of a cycle, In the same
way that consumption does not fall back to previous lows, neither
do flow expenditures of firms fall all the way back to previous
low levels 124 If we also introduce the Levis hypothesis that national
saving is chiefly out of profits and that wage and salary earners
1 2 3Simon Kuznets discusses this point briefly in Simon Kuznets,
W. E, Moore, and J. J. Spengler (editors), Economic Growth: Brazil, India,
Japan, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1955) pp. 13-14.
124Evidently the longer the downturn and trough last the less
is the Goodwin proposition applicable ,
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save little or nothing of theIr icomewe have additional reason for
the Consumption Outlays to be V rpmive dowunwrd Otha upward as
wage and salary income seem to fAuctUate less eycaicaiiy than do profits
These arguments indicate that non-cap'ta acu;tin expenditures tend
to rise readily in periods of rapid growth, bPut are sticky in their down-
ward response to a Iaing incoe i ii thierefore coMpt.LLA ionl behavior
that prevents Income frcm fall.ing to Je saie WP l vel during the dowt-
turn of successive cycles To say the same thing ditfterently, it to con-
sumption habits that prevent .the cycle from fluctuating around a
'hori zontal trend, s
It seems clear assc that few tieties with relatively high ircome
could support an average propenciy tt save of say 5, and therefyore this
upward push on total de rnd resulting trom what is in effect an upward
shirt in the consumption function tens almost ossenti it huge and in-
creasing governrent deficit4 are to be avoided. Tist is largely the old
form of the oversavirg problem atm it need say no more about it.,
There is another exceedivgl y timpcrtant way that consumption seems
especially strategic as a eotivating force in growth. We have empha-
sized frequently the r'ole of new indu-tries an; new fins as eesential
to continuing growth- We have alio observed that the incone elasticity
for virtually Vny . igle prdctt or type of produat will at Some level
of income become less than unlty. Thus as income rises through time,
demand for old products will doclne relatively to income, and deAund
will iwitch to new products., the change in the composition of
deand facilitates -- Iindeed require - new induitrie anc
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new fi rw produc ing ne" podc and growth of new eneprises
then tencd to 'carry* he y- ,umer dair4h-d ea.ier
If the income ltity V C each pro(et-t any
given time--equAled un4 1 y, the *11 e reasing resourece ilable
to the society would have toa be to produc e thi xiting
composition of output 2he ionsU i. "ity incoa elsi +dcity for
some products macns that resouwes ae mia l imbie t:o prode new
products If the lypotesis that invei :oxa and t~nvat io0s are
much more ditfiiul t and iherefooe iess ikely to occur in old Industries
than in new is reasonable this be;avr o the oporn tion of con-
sumption is of rgreat re? 1ance 2i risanecsary At efBect in order
to prevent the r-ate of rturn on eagpal from £aling rc/ard zero
and the capital-output r&tio risn to tbe point where in virtuly
ceases to grow,
Furthermoree it .eem p new industries mrannad by
utew men contit e an taporta saurce of optimism and illingness
to bear risk that ie tAbscnUti old iutstries--even though the latter
are growing And as e have ano ggeted a changing composition of
demand of onasumer products is peraa a strong counte rorce to
monopoly tendencies.,
If these (and other evi denT cone tures about consumer behavior
are approxiimately correct, it is vlear that further study of the
dynamics of consumption may ibe reyrdrixng to the economist interested
to growth, It may even ,ead to a reformuition of the effect. of
consumption on aggregative demand in t erms other than the C'onsIIuMptioU
IunL t Iou
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It is unnecessary to seek ;w deflnit.tve answer to the question
as to fhether it is the ent.repreneur C the consumer that produces
the spark necessary to wove the system indeed the question itself
is perhaps not a meaningful question tt is surely correct to think
in terms of entrepreneurlJ behavior s the strategic factor in the
short run and consumptio. passnive Over a long period of time it is--
equally surely--misleading to thik sitmAply in terms of a long run
consumption tuncti:on" wd act rning ore Iraine to be saLtd
V. The Social Setting
it is almost truistic to say that the effectiveness with which an
economic system performs depends to a significant degree upon the whole
125culture of which the economy is a part. It is therefore equally almost
truistic to say that the rate of growth of income depends upon the restraints
imposed upon that growth by the prevailing value system and the social structure
that represents these values. It is clear also that the non-economic part of
the cultural universe is not independent of the economic part, and that it
responds tc changes that are in some sense or other 'purely economic'.
This is simply to say that the economic and the non-economic react upon each
other in a complex fashion, and it is difficult Lf not impossible to ascer-
tain the source of nit Lating disturbances Almost all economists pay lip
service to these notions, but there is little in the way of a systematic
formulation of hypotheses and their introduction into a growth model. 1 2 6
Kenneth B. Boulding seems to think that "cultural factors" are more
important in explaining the functioning of an economic system than are "economic
factors." See his "Religious Foundations of Economic Progress," Harvard Business
Review Vol. m (y-June 1952) pp. 33-40.
126. A few sources that seen to me to be most useful in this area are
Alexander Gershenkron, "Social Attitudes, Entrepreneurship, and Economic
Development, " Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Vol. VI (October 195)
pp. 1-19; Bert F. loselita, "Social Structure and Economic Growth," Economia
Internasionale,Vol. VI (August 1953) pp.52-78 and the references heret
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We can do little mo" here than suggest the more obvi ous forms of the above
mentioned interaction that seem to be relevant in an analys.s of economic growth.
A value system is of course no;t merely a jumble of unrelated parts but
rather it is a set of consistent and related components reflect .ng the
se-eral segments of behavior, beliefs and attitudes that go to make up the
values of a given system. We may iLndeed think of a general "Walrasian"
model encompasaing all aspects of society, and indicating that there mast be
a consistency among the parts of the system in precisely the same way that a
Walrasian (or Leontief) economic model shows that there must be .nternal con-
sistency within the economic system taken alone. For the societal model the
"purely economic system" would constitute only a s.ngle part, but by thinking
of it as a sector within a larger whole we can see more clearly the -nter-
dependence with which we are concerned. The questions at hand are limited
to two: first, what kind of characteristics of the whole society are most
useful in fac.litating the growth of the economic sector, and secondly, how
do the characteristios of the society as a whole change as the economy grows
and how do these changes in turn affect the performance of the economic sector?
Levy and Parsons; W.A. Lewis' The Theory of Economic Growth, op. cit.
Chapters III and IV; Francis L.K Hsu, itCultural Factors" in the previously
cited Williamson and Buttrick -olume; and John E. Sawyer, "Social Structure
and Economic Progress"' American Economic Review, Vol. XLI (May 1951),
pp. '21-"29.
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In very general terms the first question can be answered easily enough,
albeit somewhat tautologically. In the first place there is general agreement
that institutional arrangements that permit to the maximum extent possible
(without anarchy) flexibility and adaptability within the economic sector
will contribute positively to economic growth. In the second place the value
system of the community must be such that high prestige is attached to economic
achievement and to the creation and possession of productive wealth if economic
progress is to be encouraged.
It seems self-evident that the lower the barriers to mobility--especially
vertical mobility--the more easily and smoothly will a system grow. The arbi-
trary limitation of certain economic roles to certain social groups irrespective
of capacity may of course prevent resources from being allocated in an optimum
fashion. Similarly the'prevalence of a familial relationship that dictates
that a son must pursue the same occupation in the same geographic area as his
father is an obstacle to the creation of a pool of new men ready and eager to
assume the risks of new investments and innovations, and, as we have observed
earlier, such a pool may be crucial for continuing economic growth. Similarly,
favorable attitudes toward new ideas, new products, and new techniques make
the tasks of the entrepreneur simpler and less risky. There are numerous other
examples that one might give of how the effect of a society dominated by a
caste system (of any kind) affects the behavior of the economic sector in a
negative way; the key point however is in need of little elaborati.on: a society
and institutional system that interferes with freedom in the seeking out and
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exploiting of economic opportunities by all levels of society interferes
with economic growth. For the most part such effects are reflected in-the
matrix of k's and b's, causing the latter to be low due to a downward
pressure on the profit rate and the supply of entrepreneurial service and the
former to be high due to the depressed efficiency of the labor force.
With respect to the value system effect on economic growth the points
usually are made that the most competent and alert young men go into professions
to whlch society attaches the great-est prstge and that the supply of labor
tends to be more stable and more responsive to economic incentive in those
social systems where there are no ethical, religious, or moral scruples against
improving oneps economic well being. Once more such observations are largely
self-evident and need little defense. If the goals and values of a society
prescribe patterns of normative behavior such that increased material welfare
is not acceptable conduct, then it is not surprising that an economic system
in such a culture is faced with severe and perhaps insurmountable difficulties.
Indeed given the inter-dependence system we previously described, such a value
system--i.e., such a pattern of normative conduct--and a rapidly growing economic
sector simply cannot coexist. On the other hand, a society that attaches
great importance to the accumulation of productive wealth may be expected to
produce an economic system that is limited only by the resources available
to it.
The description of the kind of social and value system that contributes
to economic growth is--as we noted--relatively simple and unrevealing. The
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major problen b.th ia terms 'f diticulty and in teram of importance is that
of waking explicit the relati onshi betwm eonomic change ad Social change
and beteen social change and economic change. Unbapp ly we seem to know very
little about such relationships, and it is necessary to content ourselves with
a fen brief generalities
To fix our ideas consider an economic and social system that are consistent
with each other but per capita income is constant, i e ., no economic growth is
taking place,. Now suppose a shock occurs someehere In the system that results
in the ecvAomic sector beginning to grow The question we are interested
In is this: Does this growth produce changts in the non-economic sector that
facilitate the continuation of that growth or do changes result that increase
the difficulties of maintaining growth?
It seems clear enough that the longer that grcwth can be maintained the
mcre will the non-economic sector change to make the growth process easier.
As growth continues the old institutions and old values become increasingly
obsolete, and no longer fulfill the purpose for which they were originally
intended . In the same way that attitudes *ad beliefs are formed because they
are convenient and useful, they tend to be discarded when they become a
barrier to what the people want. As the economy expands those patterns of
conduct that impede further growth become increasingly unacceptable to an
increasingly large proportion of the population, and 1ll exercise less and
less control over the behavior of the society in general This is especially
true if new n are responsible for or involved in the upsurge of growth and
previous leaders are obvious losers, with the result that those most in favor
of the new ideas and new institutions that lead to growth gain positions of
e~ I .c)rity in influencing behavior and attitudes.
~27.
Chi7ckn and egg problms *ound in such n area of discussion Whicb
case first, religion or the r-se of emptalisa?
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Since as some parts of the value system change the remainder must also change
to maintain internal consistency, we may expect the system as a whole to
become more suited to economic growth.128
Our previous discussions suggest something of the modus operandi by which
such cumulative social and institutional changes work themselves out. We have
accepted the proposition that urban living itself tends to result in a reduction
in the extent to which the society is tradition bound, and correspondingly
to increase the ease with which innovation of all kinds--not just technical--
are accepted and become effective. Perhaps the most relevant consideration
in this respect is the loosening of family ties, especially those having to
do with economic dependence. As it becomes more and more difficult to
maintain family unity and family responsibility the individual is forced to
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rely upon his own imagination and initiative in order to Survive This
will presumably make him more open minded toward the new ideas of others as
well as more alert for innovation from which he personally can profit and which
will contribute to the growth of the system.
The increased extent and frequency of personal contact may also lead to
creation of new wants and new 'needs' that in turn may affect the incentives
of members of the labor force and possibly create new sources of profits for
128. On the cumulative nature of cultural change see the discussion in
Lewis, op. cit. pp. 142-162.
129. This point is given prime importanc9 by Hsu, op. cit.
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potential investors. If we accept the proposition that wants are--st least
to some extent--a function of knowledge of available products and the capacity
to acquire new products, institutional and structural changes that increase
the awareness of new objects will thereby increase the effort of the population
to acquire such objects. 130
In the same way that increased personal contact and greater knowledge act
to make the consumer more amenable to new ideas and new products, it makes the
spread of new techniques among producing units simpler and less risky . Also
contributing to the ease with which new techniques are introduced is the de-
creased role of household production in total output. Where production units
are under the supervision and control of full time entrepreneurs and managers,
we may expect obstacles imposed by imperfect 1nowlege, frictions, etc. concerning
new methods to be more effectively overcome than in those cases where the units
are small and production is largely oriented around the household. Indeed the
breakdown of barriers to technological and management innovations due to
widespread and more effective contacts and communication among entrepreneurs
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may be the most important institutional change that accompanies growth.
Vi nave already had occasion to mention the effect of grcwth on the evolution
of a middle class, or perhaps more appropriately we should speak of the evolution
of several classes--income or otherwise--between the lowest and the highest.
130. See the discussion in Elizabeth E. Hoyt, "Want development in
Undeveloped Areas," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LIX (June 1951),
pp. 194-202.
131.
Charles Wolf, Jr., "Institutions and Economic Development,
American Economic Review, Vol. XLV (December 1955) pp. 867-883.
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In many pre-industrial societies there are only two groups, the rich and
the poor. If classes emerge between these two eStremes, it is suggested that
this will act positively on incentives for both consumer and producer. A
nore or less coatinuous gradatioc from bottom to top simplifies the understanding
of what aa upward moveusat in income means, increases the contact of persons
in several groups, and makes easier the movement between classes .132 By
increasing awareness of the advantages of higher income and at the same time
mkipg it appear auch more nearly possible to move up the income ladder--at
least a step or two--we may expect incentives and effort to be increased.
. Other factors contributing to making the social system more conducive
to economic growth may be mentioned briefly. The age composition of the
population will tend to move in such a way that an increasing proportion of the
population are in the more flexible, adaptable age groups. It is probably also
helpful that more and more perseas receive high school and college educations.
Finally it is perhaps useful to call attention to a point that has been
emphasized by several writers on innovations; namely, the importance of leisure
in facilitating the discovery and implementatton of new products and new
techniques . If such a positive relationship betwoen leisure and innovations
exist, increasing per capita income, vaking leisure posbible (and probably
more acceptable to all elements of the society), may also contribute to a
speeding up on innovations.
132. Cf . Benjamin Higgins, "The Dualistic Theory of Underdeveloped
Areas," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. IV (January 15),
pp. 99-115.
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If the preceding suggestions as to the mature of cultural change are
reasonable the early stages of economic growth are marked by a slow
breakdon of those attitudes and institutional arrangts that are incompatible
with a growing economic system. The behavior of the son-ecomomic sector is
such that it permits the economic sector to grow relatively slowly at the outset
of the growth process, but the longer that economic growth proceeds the more
compatible to growth do the social end institutional factors become, thus
permitting a rising rate of growth of income.
gome writers have suggested that after a long period of growth further
changes occur that result in a society less adaptable and less encouraging
to change. Reference is frequently made for example to the increased emphasis
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on security as opposed to growth as a goal of large segments of society.
Such emphasis may result in opposition to technological change because of
fear of unemployment or to the development of institutional arrangements such
as pension plans and unemployment insurance schems that reduce labor
mobility. The security consciousness may also result in legislation that, in
order to prevent certain elemeats of the population from being hurt by economic
change, discourages the incentives necessary to achieve an optinua allocation
of labor. Also writers have noted that the growth of large scale technology
and of bureaucratic big business tends to create as atmosphere that is
detrimental to individualism in general and new ideas as to productive techniques
and business practices in particular. This, in turn, is reflected not only
133'This is suggested B.S. geirstead, An Essay on the Theory of Profits
and Income Distribution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953). pp. 141 ff.
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in the supply of suggested new processes, but in the willingness and
capacity of the system to institute changed programs of any sort. Not only
may the society develop attitudes ad behavior characteristics that are oriented
toward security ad stability at the expease of growth, but so also do the
business leaders that govern the system's productive firms develop such
attitudes.
The argument that the nos-economic sector of society changes to facilitate
the growth of the economic sector in the early stages of the growth process is
ocasiderably more convincing than the proposition that attitudes and insti-
tuions become antithetical to growth after the economy has become well
developed. But whether we accept the latter argument or not it seems clear
that the positive effect cm growth of cultural change will become progressively
less and less as the system achieves higher and higher pr capita income. We
may expect them that insofar as the contribution of changes in the social sector
are concerned, per capita income may grow with difficulty in the initial stages
of development, then experiesce fewer and fewer obstacles and therefore grow
more rapidly, and eventually the growth facilitating changes in the social
system at large become in effect negligible (or possibly even negative).
Conclusion
The preceding sections were aimed at collecting contemporary
thoughts on the several aspects of the growth process that seem to
have been emphasized in recent literature, and trying to put them
into a single unitied analytical framework, What can be said in
summary about the usefulness and applicability of the set of ideas
that we have put together?
It is of course clear that here--as with any theory--to apply it
to any particular area over any particular interval of time numerous
special assumptions, appropriate to the area and the time, must be
introduced into the general framework. This is especially true in
the case here as we have omitted any but casual reference to governmental
activity and international trade. But to say that a general argument
must be modified--must be particularized--before it is applied in
a given instance is not a criticism or a limitation of the general
argument, it is simply a characteristic of the theory-making process.
It is well to emphasize also that shocks to a system are crucial
to the explanation of its time path, and shocks--by definition--are
outside the explanatory mechanism of the theory, Such random events
interrupt the performance of the explained behavior of the variables,
and therefore unless the shocks are relatively mild they may dominate
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the behavior of the system making the exact part of the theory somewhat
superfluous. The assumption then must be made that the shocks are
infrequent enough and mild enough that it makes 'sense to establish
the exact part of the theory.
Recognizing these last two principles--inherent in theorizing
about almost any phenomenon--what seem to be the strategic features
of the growth process?
First of all, it is evident that nothing begets growth like growth.
If a country is able to generate enough steam to get the growth
process under way, that process itself tends to create conditions and
aa atmosphere that are conducive to further growth. Thus in dis-
cussing the parameters of the short-run model we found reason to
think that in each case the parameter would in the early stages of
growth be inimical to rapid growth but then as growth proceeded would
ohange in such a way as to facilitate a rise in the rate of growth.
We were more confident in some cases than in others, but in each
instance the presumption was that each aspect of the growth process
tended to contribute to a slowly growing system at first and then
a gradually rising growth rate.
Secondly, however, as growth proceeds two developments present
themselves that suggest that continued increases in the rate of growth
of income become increasingly difficult to achieve: first, many of
the social and institutional factors that early in growth are barriers
to be destroyed, once destroyed are unable to continue contributing
to a speeding up of growth. For example, the absence of a well
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equipped banking Syatem may be a wignaifticant barrier that, as It is
corrected, allows growth to proceed more rapidly ; but once an ef -
fective banking system is established it seems clear that it will
not keep on aiding in riaiing the rowth rate. This is to say, that
we found that s-o'me factors have a once-Ad-tor-aZl effeet on growth,
the effect thea eom perisive t' e, t atn coatributory. The
other factor that s eemed to enntribt e o increr.sng dificulty in
maintaIning a risin te of grort h of ncome is* corected With the
scale effect on groatbh Increasing siz:g ot an e:rnmcmy proceeding from
a small base results in variou* kinds of econmivs of sae, but such
economies are finite in quantlity and effc-t- 11 Peems vlva.r that
after an economy has reached a given rize, furtbr iacreases in the
size of the sy#tem itself will not result in furtex economzies of
scale and indeed nay create a daLsical diminishuing returnv problem.
If we put reault oe and i',o togethevr wze evidently get a growth
picture something like the foleowing at the outset growth to Likely
to be very SlI (posadhiy even neCt.ive because of population behavior),
then, to gather speed and proceed at a rvAbi for a, period, and eventually
to tend to tapear off
But th'en howevert' i the thrd place, it nec'esaary to introduce
two variable dhat are very di ffic.t .t aage aytily tnventions
and innovationsu We fnund it ossiatble to ac y firea resqults as
to the time path of the invention and innovation effect on the
economic iystem, and therefore concluded that it Sas impossible
to arrive at a decisioe as to whether or not an economy riould run
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down and cease to grow. We would go further and assert that until
we know more about the determinants of technological change, it is
not possible to say with confidence what the prospects are with
respect to secular stagnation or secular exhilaration.
We found in the fourth place, that the immediate determinant of
growth was the activity of entrepreneurs as capital accumulators,
inventors, and innovators. In making the investment process something
more than a more automatic response to changing output, we put con-
siderable weight upon the behavior of entrepreneurs and the supply of
entrepreneurial services through time in explaining the growth process.
We made investment decisions chiefly a function of the expected
profit rate and the extent of entrepreneurial services. The profit
rate behavior is determined chief ly by innovations, while the supply
of entrepreneurial services seem to be more appropriately explained
in terms of the value and social system and the institutions repre-
sentative thereof. Thus innovations are seen to be crucial on the
demand side--to prevent a declining profit rate--as well as on the
supply side--to prevent diminishing returns.
But though entrepreneurial activity is the immediate moving force
of the system consumer behavior--and this is our fifth point--is
equally relevant, if not more so, over a long pull. Of particular
importance are two points: oonsumer behavior is one of two factors
(the other is technological change) responsible for the changing
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composition of output, and as we have seen the changing composition
of output has exceedingly important ramifications- throughout the system.
In particular in the early stages of growth it results in a rise in
the tempo of the urbanization movement and from this increased urban-
ization we deduced several important consequences. Also, changing
output composition requires the creation of new industries and this
is, we have seen, crucial in a number of ways to continuing growth,.
The other characteristic of consumer behavior that is important for
growth (and this may be true of business firms as well) is the propo-
sition that consumption expenditures hold the system up in periods
of cyclical downturn and so prevent the troughs of successive cycles
from all being on the same level. Investment activity alone probably
is not able to do this, and innovations seem too erratic.
The final point may be made in this way: We have assumed that
the economy continued to grow and we traced out the nature of this
growth process, At any point, any number of obstacles--e-og , population
behavior, savings, inventions, entrepreneurial services, etc. ,--may
result in growth being aborted. In an analysis of why a system i's
not growing it becomes important to isolate the immediate bottleneck
and eliminate it. Our analysis is useful for this task, but empirical
material of a more specific kind would be necessary in attacking
a given problem of "not growth."
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Undoubtedly many readers will find reason to object to much of
the preceeding essay either because of misrepresentation of current
thinking on some one or more aspects or because the analysis as I
have set it down is open to dispute due to questionable theorizing
ancVor questionable empirical assertions. Perhaps it is possible to
conclude on an observation for which complete agreement may be ex-
pected: There is an awful lot that we do not know about economic growth.

